Morgan Stanley



Mitigating Against Large Scale Systemic Failure in E-Trading

Chris Hawley, Executive Director March 2025

Time of Day Matters

Approx. Average Volume on London and US Stock Exchanges



■London ■US

London Stock Exchange Incident

December 2023

66

Small-cap trading on London stock market hit by outages

Reuters December 5th, 2023 A hardware failure caused degraded performance in a disk array.

This was below the automated failover threshold but still caused the market to stop trading twice.

Sources: https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/lseg-says-incident-impacting-trading-stock-market-2023-12-05/ https://docs.londonstockexchange.com/sites/default/files/documents/live - 001 - 05122023 - london_stock_exchange - 05_december_2023 - technical_incident_update.pdf

Potential Risks From Incidents



Financial Regulatory Reputational

Typical Availability Patterns

Physical Deployments



Multiple instances running in multiple locations.



Protects against host/network failures



Regular use ensures functionality works



Ability to scale for capacity and segregation requirements

Typical Availability Patterns

Staggered Deployments



Changes progressively rolled out over different instances

- Builds confidence in a change via steadily increasing scope
- Impact of an issue is reduced, and allows uninterrupted trading if we must roll back

Things Can Still Go Wrong

Tail Risks Still Exist

Those approaches reduce the risk, but can't eliminate it

- Complex systems will always be exposed somewhere
- Problems can go years without being triggered
- When triggered, we end up with widespread impact



Long Tail Risks



Incident Example





















Modular Functionality



Modular Functionality



Modular Functionality



Alternative System



Alternative System



Alternative System



Summary



Questions?