

MAGE: Nearly Zero-Cost Virtual Memory for Secure Computation

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Secure Computation (SC)



Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) [Yao86, GMW87]

Application: Password Reuse Detection [WR19, PKY+21]



Potential SC Applications



SC has high memory overhead for these applications

Our system, MAGE, addresses the SC memory bottleneck

Memory Overhead of Secure Computation

- SC requires computation on encrypted data (ciphertexts)
- Ciphertexts can be *much* larger than plaintexts
 - 128× expansion factor for garbled circuits (type of SMPC)



Memory Can Be a Bottleneck for SC

- "[SMPC] in practice only scales to a few thousand input records" [VSG+19]
 - Existing framework cannot even join *30,000 records* due to memory size
- 16-party set intersection (equi-join) scales to 10,000 integers [PKY+21]
 - "We observed a stark increase in runtime ... due to the exhaustion of available memory"

What Makes OS Virtual Memory Slow?

Based on heuristics

(doesn't always work well)

Reactive procedure (reacts to page faults)

Our system, MAGE, runs SC at nearly the same speed as if the machine had **unbounded physical memory**.

Key Observation: SC Programs are **Oblivious**

Normal Program (Unsuitable for SC)

```
uint a = input("alice");
uint b = input("bob");
uint c;
if (a < b) {
    c = a;
} else {
    c = b;
}
```

```
Oblivious Program (Suitable for SC)
uint a = input("alice");
uint b = input("bob");
uint less = a < b;
uint cond = 0 - less;
uint c = ((a ^ b) & cond) ^ b;</pre>
```

- This property is inherent to SC's privacy guarantees.
- Given an SC program, we can *pre-compute* its memory access pattern to pre-plan memory management.





Company #1

David: Password D Sam: Password B Alice: Password E

...



Company #2



Company #1

(Sort locally by username)

Alice: Password E David: Password D Sam: Password B



Company #2









MAGE's Workflow



Generating a Memory Program



What Makes OS Virtual Memory Slow?





Additional Challenges

How to cope with the size of the memory access pattern?

How to extract the memory access pattern from the DSL?

How to incorporate prefetching into Belady's algorithm?

How to parallelize/distribute the computation?

How to extend MAGE with support for new SC protocols?

See paper for details

Implementation

- 11,000 lines of C++
- Supports:
 - Garbled circuits (type of SMPC)
 - CKKS (type of Fully Homomorphic Encryption)
- User program (runs on unmodified Linux)

Evaluation

- We compare three setups:
 - Unbounded: Get enough memory to fit the entire computation
 - MAGE: Use our system MAGE
 - OS: Rely on OS swapping

Workloads



- For 7 workloads, MAGE performs within 10% of Unbounded
- For 7 workloads, MAGE outperforms OS by at least 4×
- MAGE outperforms OS by up to an order of magnitude

Password Reuse Application



- MAGE can process up to 100 million user/password records
- For a given time budget, MAGE can handle a 3× larger problem

Conclusion

MAGE is a planner and runtime for secure computation. It:

- Leverages SC's obliviousness to rethink memory management for SC
- Pre-plans data transfers between storage and memory
- In many cases, runs SC at nearly in-memory speeds

MAGE's techniques could also potentially benefit:



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Thank you!

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