

# On the Security of Picture Gesture Authentication

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# Picture Gesture Authentication (PGA)

- A built-in feature in Microsoft Windows 8
- 60 million Windows 8 licenses have been sold
- 400 million computers and tablets will run Windows 8 in one year


# How PGA Works

## Welcome to picture password

Picture password is a new way to help you protect your touchscreen PC. You choose the picture -- and the gestures you use with it -- to create a password that's uniquely yours.

When you've chosen a picture, you "draw" directly on the touchscreen to create a combination of taps, straight lines, or circles. The size, position, and direction of your gestures become part of your picture password.

Choose picture



# How PGA Works


- Autonomous picture selection by users

## Welcome to picture password

Picture password is a new way to help you protect your touchscreen PC. You choose the picture -- and the gestures you use with it -- to create a password that's uniquely yours.


When you've chosen a picture, you "draw" directly on the touchscreen to create a combination of taps, straight lines, or circles. The size, position, and direction of your gestures become part of your picture password.

Choose picture



# How PGA Works

- Three types of gestures are allowed
  - Tap
  - Circle
  - Line



# Research Questions

1. How to understand user-choice patterns in PGA?
  - Background Pictures
  - Gesture Location
  - Gesture Type
  - Gesture Order
2. How to use these patterns to guess PGA password?

# Outline

Part 1: Analysis of more than 10,000 PGA passwords collected from user studies

Part 2: A fully automated attack framework on PGA

Part 3: Attack results on collected passwords

# Part I: User Studies

## 1. Web-based PGA system

- Similarity to Windows PGA
  - Workflow
  - Appearance


## 2. Data collection

## 3. Analysis: survey and results




# Part I: User Studies

- Dataset-I
  - ASU undergraduate computer security class (Fall 2012)
  - 56 participants
  - 58 unique pictures
  - 86 passwords
  - 2,536 login attempts

**CSE 465 Information Assurance**

**How's this look?**  
  
  
Does this picture have PII?  
(Personally Identifiable Information)  
  
If you do not want to participate in the user study, simply email your Subject ID 16822 to the TA after the semester. We delete all of your pictures and gestures from our database.



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## CSE 465: Information Assurance (2012 Fall)


[Announcements](#)  
[Syllabus](#)  
[Lecture Notes](#)  
[Assignments](#)  
[Group Projects](#)  
[Change Password](#)  
[Finish Survey](#)

### Lecture Notes

| Date         | Lecture | Topic   | Notes                            | Reading  |   |
|--------------|---------|---|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Aug 24, 2012 | 1       | Security Objectives and Basic Concepts                        | <a href="#">Note-1</a>           | Chapter 1  |   |
| Aug 31, 2012 | 2       | Authentication I  | <a href="#">Note-2</a>           | Chapter 11   |   |
| Sep 7, 2012  | 3       | Authentication II and Access Control I                        | <a href="#">Note-3</a>           | Chapter 2.1-2.2, 5 & <a href="#">Supplemental document #1</a>  |   |
| Sep 14, 2012 | 4       | Access Control II   | <a href="#">Note-4</a>           | Chapter 6.1-6.2, 27 & <a href="#">Supplemental document #2</a> |   |
| Sep 21, 2012 | 5       | Cryptography I  | <a href="#">Note-5</a>           | Chapter 8.1-8.2.3  |   |
| Sep 28, 2012 | 6       | Cryptography II   | <a href="#">Note-6</a>           | Chapter 8.3-8.4, 9.3, 9.5 & <a href="#">Md5collision.zip</a>   |   |
| Oct 5, 2012  | 7       | Authentication in Distributed Systems                         | <a href="#">Note-7</a>           | <a href="#">Supplemental document #3</a>                       |   |
| Oct 12, 2012 | 8       | Network Security I  | <a href="#">Note-8</a>           | Chapter 23.3.1 - 23.3  |   |
| Oct 19, 2012 | 9       | Network Security II   | <a href="#">Note-9</a>           | Chapters 10.4.2 <a href="#">Supplemental Link</a>              |   |
| Oct 26, 2012 | 10      | Intrusion Detection   | <a href="#">Note-10</a>          | Chapters 22  |   |
| Nov 2, 2012  | 11      | Database Security & Risk Management and Information Assurance | <a href="#">Note-11 Overview</a> | Chapters 18  | 1 |
| Nov 16, 2012 | 12      | Group Project Presentation I                                  | <a href="#">Note-12</a>          | Corresponding proposals  |   |
| Nov 30,      | 13      | Group Project Presentation II                                 | <a href="#">Note-13</a>          | Corresponding  |   |

# Part I: User Studies

- Dataset-2
  - Scenario: The password is used to protect your bank account
  - Amazon MTurk
  - 15 pictures selected in advance
  - 762 participants
  - 10,039 passwords



# Part I: User Studies


- Survey questions
  - General information of the subject
  - General feeling towards PGA
  - How she/he selects a background picture
  - How she/he selects a password

# Part I: User-choice Patterns


## Background Picture

People, Civilization, Landscape, Computer-generated, Animal, Others

Dataset-1



Dataset-2 Survey



# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Why or why not picture of people


- Advocates:
  - i) it is more friendly  
*'The image was special to me so I enjoy seeing it when I log in'*
  - ii) it is easier for remembering passwords  
*'Marking points on a person is easier to remember'*
  - iii) it makes password more secure  
*'The picture is personal so it should be much harder for someone to guess the password'*
- Others:
  - i) leak his or her identify or privacy  
*'revealing myself or my family to anyone who picks up the device'*

# Part I: User-choice Patterns


## Background Picture

People, Civilization, Landscape, Computer-generated, Animal, Others

Dataset-1



Dataset-2 Survey



# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Why computer-generated pictures

- Dataset-I population characteristics:
  - 81.8% Male
  - 63.6% Age 18-24, 24.0% Age 25-34
  - 100% College students
- Survey answers:
  - *'computer game is something I am interested [in] it'*
  - *'computer games picture is personalized to my interests and enjoyable to look at'*

# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Why computer-generated pictures

- Dataset-I population characteristics:
  - 81.8% Male
  - 62.6% Age 18-24, 24.0% Age 25-34

**The background picture tells much about the user's identity, personality and interests.**

- Survey answers:
  - *'computer game is something I am interested [in] it'*
  - *'computer games picture is personalized to my interests and enjoyable to look at'*



# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Gesture Locations

Which of the following best describes what you are considering when you choose locations to perform gestures?

|   | Dataset-1 | Dateset-2 |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| I try to find locations where special <b>objects</b> are.                           | 72.7%     | 59.6%     |
| I try to find locations where some special <b>shapes</b> are.                       | 24.2%     | 21.9%     |
| I try to find locations where <b>colors</b> are different from their surroundings.  | 0%        | 8.7%      |
| I randomly choose a location to draw without thinking about the background picture. | 3.0%      | 10.1%     |

# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Gesture Locations

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# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Gesture Locations

Which of the following best describes what you are considering when you choose locations to perform gestures?

**Most users tend to draw passwords on Points-of-Interest (Pols) in the background picture.**

I try to find locations where colors are different from their surroundings.

0%

8.7%

I randomly choose a location to draw without thinking about the background picture.

3.0%

10.1%

# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Gesture Locations (Picture of People)

- Dataset-I
  - 22 subjects uploaded 27 pictures of people
  - 31 passwords (93 gestures)

| Attributes  | # Gesture  | # Password | # Subject  |
|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Eye         | 36 (38.7%) | 20 (64.5%) | 19 (86.3%) |
| Nose        | 21 (22.5%) | 13 (48.1%) | 10 (45.4%) |
| Hand/Finger | 6 (6.4%)   | 5 (18.5%)  | 4 (18.2%)  |
| Jaw         | 5 (5.3%)   | 3 (11.1%)  | 3 (13.7%)  |
| Face        | 4 (4.3%)   | 2 (7.4%)   | 2 (9.1%)   |

# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Gesture Locations (Civilization)

- Dataset-I
  - Two versions of *Starry Night* uploaded by two participants



(a)




(b)

# Part I: User-choice Patterns


## Gesture Locations (Civilization)

- Dataset-I
  - Two versions of *Starry Night* uploaded by two participants



Gesture 1: Tap a star  
Gesture 2: Tap a star  
Gesture 3: Tap a star

(a)



Gesture 1: Tap a star  
Gesture 2: Tap a star  
Gesture 3: Tap a star

(b)



# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Gesture Locations (Civilization)

- Dataset-I
  - Two versions of *Starry Night* uploaded by two participants

Users have the tendencies to choose Pols with the same attributes to draw on.

Gesture 2: Tap a star  
Gesture 3: Tap a star

(a)

Gesture 2: Tap a star  
Gesture 3: Tap a star

(b)

# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Windows PGA Advertisements




Asia



# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Windows PGA Advertisements



Asia



# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Windows PGA Advertisements

Asia





South  
America




# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Windows PGA Advertisements

Asia



South America



# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Windows PGA Advertisements

Asia

Circle an  
eye

Circle an  
eye

Circle an  
ear

South  
America

Line an arm

Circle a  
head

Line an arm

Europe





# Part I: User-choice Patterns

## Windows PGA Advertisements

Asia

Circle an  
eye

Circle an  
eye

Circle an  
ear

South  
America

Line an arm

Circle a  
head

Line an arm

Europe

Line an arm

Circle a  
head

Circle a  
head

## Part 2: Attack Framework

- To generate dictionaries that have potential passwords
  - Picture-specific dictionary
  - Rank passwords with likelihood
  - Work on previously unseen pictures
- Our approach
  - Automatically learns user-choices patterns in the training pictures and corresponding passwords
  - Then applies these patterns to the target picture for dictionary generation



# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Selection Function

- Selection function
  - Models the **password creating process** that users go through
  - Takes two types of parameters
    - Gesture type, such as *tap*, *circle*, *line*
    - Pol attribute, such as *face*, *eye*, ...
  - Generates a group of gestures

# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Selection Function (Examples)

$s : \{tap, circle, line\} \times Pol\ Attributes^*$

$s(circle, face)$

*Circle a face in the picture*

$s(line, nose, nose)$

*Line a nose to another nose in the picture*

$s(tap, nose)$

*Tap a nose in the picture*


# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Extract Selection Functions

Password



Points-of-Interest




# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Extract Selection Functions

*circle* Password



*face* Points-of-Interest




# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Extract Selection Functions

Password



Points-of-Interest



Function 1:  $s(circle, face)$

# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Extract Selection Functions

Password



Points-of-Interest



# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Extract Selection Functions

Password



Points-of-Interest



Function 2:  $s(\text{line}, \text{nose}, \text{nose})$



# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Extract Selection Functions

Password



Points-of-Interest





# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Extract Selection Functions

Password



Points-of-Interest



Function 3:  $s(\textit{tap}, \textit{nose})$

# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Apply Selection Functions

Function 1:


*s(circle, face)*

Output: 4 gestures



# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Apply Selection Functions



Function 1:

*s(circle, face)*

Output: 4 gestures

Function 2:

*s(line, nose, nose)*

Output: 12 gestures

# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Apply Selection Functions



Function 1:

*s(circle, face)*

Output: 4 gestures

Function 2:

*s(line, nose, nose)*

Output: 12 gestures

Function 3:

*s(tap, nose)*

Output: 4 gestures



# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Apply Selection Functions



Function 1:

*s(circle, face)*

Output: 4 gestures

Function 2:

*s(line, nose, nose)*

Output: 12 gestures

Function 3:

*s(tap, nose)*

Output: 4 gestures

Number of potential passwords:  $4 \times 12 \times 4 = 192$

# Part 2: Attack Framework

## Rank Selection Functions

### 1. BestCover algorithm

- Derived from emts (Zhang et al., CCS'10)
- Optimizes guessing order for passwords in the **training dataset**

### 2. Unbiased algorithm

- Reduces the biased **Points-of-Interest distributions** in the training set

# Part 3: Attack Results

## Automatically Identify Pols

- OpenCV as the computer vision framework
  - Object detection
    - Face, eye, nose, mouth, ear, body
  - Low-level feature detection
    - Circle
    - Color
- Objectness measure: Alexe et al. (TPAMI'12)
  - Other standout regions

# Part 3: Attack Results

## Points-of-Interest Sets

- Pals of Dataset-1
- Identified by OpenCV
- 40 Pals at most

$P_{A-40}^1$

- Pals of Dataset-2
- Identified by OpenCV
- 40 Pals at most

$P_{A-40}^2$

- Pals of Dataset-2
- Manually labeled
- 15 Pals at most

$P_{L-15}^2$




# Part 3: Attack Results

## Methodology

- Guessability on passwords of previously unseen pictures
- Dictionary size:  $2^{19} = 524,288$

# Part 3: Attack Results

## Dateset-1 vs. Dateset-2




# Part 3: Attack Results

## BestCover vs. Unbiased

~9400 training passwords

BestCover 24.03%

Unbiased 24.09%




# Part 3: Attack Results

## BestCover vs. Unbiased


60 training passwords  
Unbiased 23.44%

BestCover  
13.27%




# Part 3: Attack Results

## Labeled Pol set vs. OpenCV-Identified Pol set



# Part 3: Attack Results

## Simple Pictures (Unbiased algorithm)



243.jpg




316.jpg



# Part 3: Attack Results

## Portraits (Unbiased algorithm)



1116.jpg




7628.jpg



# Part 3: Attack Results

## Complex Picture (Unbiased algorithm)




6412.jpg





# Part 3: Attack Results

## Online Attacks on Dataset-2



# PGA Password Strength Meter

- <https://honeyproject1.fulton.asu.edu/stmidx>
- BestCover algorithm
- Generate dictionary and calculate strength in 20 seconds



Password Strength  
weak

# Summary and Future Work

- We have presented an analysis of user-choice patterns in PGA passwords
- We have proposed an attack framework on PGA
- We have evaluated our approach on collected datasets
- We plan to improve online attack results by integrating shoulder-surfing and smudge attacks into our framework

Thank you!  
Q & A