### Universal Radio Hacker

### A Suite for Analyzing and Attacking Stateful Wireless Protocols

Johannes Pohl and Andreas Noack

University of Applied Sciences Stralsund

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#### Internet of Things

### Proprietary wireless protocols everywhere

#### Smart Home

- Increase comfort through wireless sockets, door locks, valve sensors...
- Devices are designed under size and energy constraints
- Less resources for cryptography



#### **Risks of Smart Home**

- Manufactures design custom proprietary wireless protocols
- Hackers may take over households and e.g. break in without physical traces

How can we eavesdrop and manipulate the wireless communication between such devices to assess the security?

### Software Defined Radio

### Why Software Defined Radios?

- Send and receive on nearly arbitrary frequencies<sup>a</sup>
- Flexibility and extendability with custom software
- <sup>a</sup>e.g. HackRF: 1 MHz 6 GHz



(a) USRP N210





Introduction

Attacking a Door Lock

Conclusion

Software Defined Radios

### Software Defined Radios are affordable Last Checked: July 21, 2018



#### NooElec HackRF One Software Defined Radio (SDR)

by NooElec

\$**317**<sup>95</sup> **√prime** Get it by **Wednesday**, Jul 25 FREE Shipping on eligible orders

#### NooElec NESDR SMArt - Premium RTL-SDR Software Defined Radio

by NooElec




Attacking a Door Lock

Software Defined Radios




Attacking a Door Lock

Software Defined Radios




Attacking a Door Lock

Software Defined Radios



Attacking a Door Lock

Software Defined Radios




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


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Protocol		

### Overview




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Protocol		
Overview		




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
### Overview



Introduction 0000	Attacking a Door Lock O●0000000000	Conclusion 00
Protocol		
Overview		




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Protocol		
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### Overview




#### Interpretation

### Record and demodulate signal






#### Zoom into start of second message



#### Interpretation

## Demodulation and Signal Editing with URH



#### Further Interpretation Features

- Synchronized selection between demodulated and raw signal
- Signal Editor i.e. copy, paste, crop, mute signal selections
- Configurable moving average and bandpass filters

Introduction
Analysis

### Analysis phase

In Analysis phase we reverse engineer the protocol format.

Example for	mat	
Preamble	Synchronization	Length Source Address
Destinati	on Address Data	Checksum

This includes

- Decode messages
- Labeling of protocol fields
- Group messages by assigning message types

# What kind of decoding does the door lock use?

### All messages are encoded in the following way

- Pseudo encryption
- Oata Whitening
- (Modulation)

Analysis

### **Pseudo Encryption**

#### Code

```
enc[0] = msg[0];
enc[1] = ~(msg[1]) ^ 0x89;
for(i = 2; i < NUM_BYTES; i++)
enc[i] = (enc[i-1]+0xdc) ^ msg[i];
```

#### Use

- Does not increase the security
- Assumption: Obscure method for pseudo security

# Data Whitening

#### Data Whitening

- To increase transmission quality a data whitening is used
- XOR with each 8 LSB of a pseudo-random sequence generated by an LFSR represented by the polynomial  $x^9+x^5+x^0$

### • Initial state is 111111111

### First eight states of the LFSR

```
\begin{array}{c} 111111111 \Rightarrow 011111111 \Rightarrow 001111111 \Rightarrow 0001111111 \Rightarrow \\ 0000111111 \Rightarrow 100001111 \Rightarrow 110000111 \Rightarrow 1110000111 \end{array}
```

# Decodings with URH

MyDecoding \$	Delete	
Base Functions	Decoder	Information and Options
Edge Trigger Morse Code Substitution External Program	Signal Invert Change Bitorder Invert #2	## DECODING PROCESS ## Invert: All bits are inverted, i.e. 0->1 and 1->0.
Additional Functions		
Invert Differential Encoding Change Bitorder Remove Redundancy Remove Darrier Remove Data Whitening (CC1101) Wireless Short Packet (WSP)		
Cut before/after	Decoded Bits	
Signal (0,1):		
Test ‡ 10010110		
Decoded Bits:		[Decoding Errors = 0]
01101001		

#### Analysis

### Result in URH after decoding and labeling

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/iew data as:	2			a a		а	а	а	е	9	с	а	е	9	с	а	1	1	0	а	а	
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Configure Decoding:	4	а	а	a a	a	а	а	а	е	9	С	а	е	9	С	а	1	2	0	а	8	
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Decoding errors for messag	je:		Oti	her	Ор	tic	ons:	50	eleo	ct .	all,	FI	Ite	r, .	Aliį	gn						
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Show only diffs in protoc	ol																					
Show only labels in proto	col																					
Analyze	• Bit	t: 111	01001		Hex	: e9				Decim	al: 23	3							2 colu	ımn(s	) sele	et
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<ul> <li>✓ preamble</li> <li>✓ synchronization</li> <li>✓ length</li> </ul>	preamble	Bit		MSE	B/BE		10101		1010	10101	01010	01010	1010									
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<ul> <li>✓ preamble</li> <li>✓ synchronization</li> <li>✓ length</li> <li>✓ sequence number</li> <li>✓ control</li> </ul>	preamble synchronizati length	Bit Hex Decir	nal	MSE MSE MSE	3/BE 3/BE 3/BE		10101 e9cae 25		1010	10101	0101(	01010	1010									
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Introduction	Attacking a Door Lock	Conclusion
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Simulation		

### Simulation phase

# In Simulation phase we can work on the logical layer. URH takes care of **Modulation** and **Encoding** during simulation time.

CI	D		
	1. [Trigger command]		
	2.1. IF		
	iteml.rc > 0		
	2.1.1. [Goto: item6]		
	3. preamble synchronization length sequence number control type source address destination address cipher crc		
	4. [Trigger command]		
	5.1. IF		
	item4.rc == 0		
	5.1.1. [Goto: item3]		
	6. preamble synchronization length sequence number control type source address destination address command checksum		
	7. preamble       synchronization       length       sequence       number       control       type       source       address       destination       address       command       challenge       magic       checksum         8. preamble       synchronization       length       sequence       number       control       type       source       address       destination       address       cipher       checksum		
	9. preamble synchronization length sequence number control type source address destination address command authentication checksum		

Introd	uction
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Simulation

### Demonstration Video

# Summary and future work

#### Summary

- **Software Defined Radios** offer a high flexibility when investigating radio protocols
- Tools like **Universal Radio Hacker** abstract the required HF basics and enable analyzing such protocols without having to be a hardware expert
- Smart Home manufactureres have to react, Security by Obscurity is no longer an option

### Ongoing work

- Rule based intelligence for automatic analysis phase
- Enhance accuracy of detecting interpretation parameters
- Support for more complex modulations e.g. 4-PSK



🗘 https://github.com/jopohl/urh 🖞 🚛 🗯

#### Contact

• E-Mail: Johannes.Pohl90@gmail.com

E-Mail: Andreas.Noack@hochschule-stralsund.de

- Slack: https://bit.ly/2LGpsra
- GitHub: https://github.com/jopohl