Gone in 360 Seconds: Hijacking with Hitag2

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Vehicle Immobilizers

- Passive RFID Tag (125 KHz)
- Introduced in the '90s
- Prevents hot-wiring
- Mandatory



- Australia (AS/NZS 4601:1999)
- Canada (CAN/ULC S338- 98)



LF 125 kHz Antenna

Hitag2 chip

• Do **not** confuse it with remote controls that unlock the car doors (433 MHz)



Hitag2 Usage



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Makes & Models

Make	Models
Acura	CSX, MDX, RDX, TL, TSX
Alfa Romeo	156, 159, 166, Brera, Giulietta, Mito, Spider
Audi	A8
Bentley	Continental
BMW	Serie 1, 5, 6, 7, all bikes
Buick	Enclave, Lucerne
Cadillac	BLS, DTS, Escalade, SRX, STS, XLR
	Avanlache, Caprice, Captiva, Cobalt, Equinox, Express, HHR
Chevrolet	Impala, Malibu, Montecarlo, Silverado, Suburban, Tahoe
	Trailblazer, Uplander
Chrysler	300C, Aspen, Grand Voyager, Pacifica, Pt Cruiser, Sebring
Chiyster	Town Country, Voyager
Citroen	Berlingo, C-Crosser, C2, C3, C4, C4 Picasso, C5, C6, C8
Ciuden	Nemo, Saxo, Xsara, Xsara Picasso
Dacia	Duster, Logan, Sandero
Daewoo	Captiva, Windstorm
Dodge	Avenger, Caliber, Caravan, Charger, Dakota, Durango
Dodge	Grand Caravan, Journey, Magnum, Nitro, Ram
Fiat	500, Bravo, Croma, Daily, Doblo, Fiorino, Grande Punto
riat	Panda, Phedra, Ulysse, Scudo
GMC	Acadia, Denali, Envoy, Savana, Siera, Terrain, Volt, Yukon
Honda	Accord, Civic, CR-V, Element, Fit, Insight, Stream,
riolida	Jazz, Odyssey, Pilot, Ridgeline, most bikes
Hummer H2, H3	

Make	Models		
	Grandeur, I30, Matrix, Santafe, Sonata, Terracan, Tiburon		
	Tucoson, Tuscanti		
Isuzu	D-Max		
Iveco	35C11, Eurostar, New Daily, S-2000		
Jeep	Commander, Compass, Grand Cherokee, Liberty, Patriot Wrangler		
Kia	Carens, Carnival, Ceed, Cerato, Magentis, Mentor, Ontima		
Lancia	Delta, Musa, Phedra		
Mini	Cooper		
Mitsubishi 380, Colt, Eclipse, Endeavor, Galant, Grandis, L20 Lancer, Magna, Outlander, Outlander, Pajero, Raid			
Nissan	Almera, Juke, Micra, Pathfinder, Primera, Qashqai, Interstar Note, Xterra		
Opel	Agila, Antara, Astra, Corsa, Movano, Signum, Vectra Vivaro, Zafira		
Peugeot	106 , 206 , 207, 307 , 406, 407, 607, 807, 1007, 3008, 5008 Beeper, Partner, Boxer , RCZ		
Pontiac	G5, G6, Pursuit, Solstice, Torrent		
Porsche	Cayenne		
Renault	Clio, Duster, Kangoo, Laguna II, Logan, Master Megane, Modus, Sandero, Trafic, Twingo		
Saturn	Aura, Outlook, Sky, Vue		
Suzuki	Alto, Grand Vitara, Splash, Swift, Vitara, XL-7		
Volkswagen Touareg, Phaeton			

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Vehicle Immobilizer



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Hitag2 Functionality

- "Quotes" from the datasheet
 - Ideally suited for vehicle immobilization
 - Proximity (20cm) and long range (1m)
 - Effective communication protocol with outstanding data integrity check
 - Secret Key and a random number in order to cipher any communication
 - Mutual authentication function
 - To achieve a main stream security, data may be transmitted enciphered



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ome Products Other Car a Other Car access & immobilizers	NXP leads the immobilize	r er market and continues to d	Irive it	l Prin
 Immobilizer Passive keyless entry Remote keyless entry Controllers : Demodulators / channel decoders Drivers : Nexperia 	With a range of security transpon		e systems as well as matching base start the next generation of remote keyless a	
 Nexpena NTSC/PAL A/V decoders/encoder Processors Key features and benefits 				
 Set-top box ICs Storage/DVD TPMS chipset 	 Easily embedded into car keys No batteries required Unbreakable security levels using mutual authentication, challenge-response and encrypted data communication Highly integrated base station ICs meet the strict quality standards required by the automotive industry, while keeping costs to 			
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Unbreakable security levels using mutual authentication, challenge-response and encrypted data communication






Hitag2 Functionality


Block Contents	
0	transponder identifier id
1	secret key low $k_0 \dots k_{31}$
2	secret key high $k_{32} \dots k_{47}$ — reserved
3	configuration — password
4 - 7	user defined memory

Command	Bits
authenticate	11000
read	$11n_0n_1n_200\overline{n_0n_1n_2}\dots$
read	$0 1 n_0 n_1 n_2 1 0 \overline{n_0 n_1 n_2} \dots$
write	$10n_0n_1n_201\overline{n_0n_1n_2}\dots$
halt	$00n_0n_1n_211\overline{n_0n_1n_2}\dots$






Authentication Protocol






Hitag2 Cipher



• 48 bit internal state (LFSR stream $a_0a_1...$) $a_0...a_{31} = id_0...id_{31}$ $a_{32}...a_{47} = k_0...k_{15}$ $a_{48+i} = k_{16+i} \bigoplus \{nr\}_i \bigoplus f(a_i...a_{47+i})_i \quad \forall_i \in [0,31]$ Initialized LFSR = $a_{32}...a_{79}$

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




- Dependencies between sessions
 - Reader nonce (nR) is **only 32 bits**
 - Remember that $a_{32}...a_{47} = k_0...k_{15}$ and initialized LFSR = $a_{32}...a_{79}$
 - We can conclude that LFSR₀...LFSR₁₅ are fixed for each session, regardless of nr



Hitag2 Cipher




• Non-linear filter function (20 \rightarrow 1 bit)

- Contains sub-functions with fewer inputs
- Tree function with two layers
- There are 5 sub-functions with 4-bit input
- Each function delivers one input bit for second layer function f_c



Hitag2 Cipher



- Filter function weakness
 - -4 bits cover 14 bits of the internal state
 - In 8 of the 32 configurations, the output of f_c is **not** influenced by the last bit
 - Probability ¼ the output is determined by the first 34 bits of the filter function



Hitag2 Protocol

read $11n_0n_1n_200\overline{n_0n_1n_2}\dots$

- After authentication, it uses encrypted instructions of 5 bits which are sent (at least) twice
- The instruction is concatenated with its complement for integrity
- Extra redundancy can be achieved by adding complements multiple times



Hitag2 Protocol

<i>read</i> $11n_0n_1n_200\overline{n_0n_1n_2}\dots$
--

- Instruction contains a 2-bit command and a 3-bit memory block
- Some examples of (equivalent) read instructions on memory block 3
 - *read* (block3) = 11011 00100
 - *read* (block3) = 11011 00100 11011
 - *read* (block3) = 11011 00100 11011 00100



Hitag2 Protocol

Replay same {nR}{aR} and use variable length to get a keystream oracle read (block3) = 11011 00100
 keystream = 01010 01101 + 10001 01001

Try all 32 possibilities, only answers when correctread (block3) = 11011 00100 11011keystream = 01010 0110110001 01001



Malleability attack

- Eavesdrop only one authentication attempt {nR}{aR} from the car
- Use oracle to recover 42 of keystream bits, enough to read out the memory
- Recover all memory blocks except the secret key (could be read protected)
 - If not configured correctly, the secret key is still readable.
 - In such a case the total attack time is less than one second



Time/memory tradeoff attack

- Once, use a smart trick to build a table with 2³⁷ cipher states
 - Sort table on 48 produced keystream bits
- Eavesdrop only one authentication attempt {nR}{aR} from the car
- Use keystream oracle to recover 2¹¹ bits
- Apply sliding window on contiguous keystream and find table entry
- Total attack time is one minute



Cryptanalytic Attack

- Gather only 134 authentication attempts from the car (~1 minute)
- Use first cipher weakness to combine different reader nonces
- Try for every 2³⁴ cipher state (~5 minutes)
 - Which ¼ of the 134 are useful to eliminate
 - If first keystream bit of {ar} passes the test
 - Verify handful of candidate keys
- Total attack time is 360 seconds



Comparison and Complexity

Attack	Description	Practical	Computation	Traces	Time
[45]	brute-force	yes	2102400 min	2	4 years
[14]	sat-solver	yes	2880 min	4	2 days
[42]	sat-solver	no ¹	386 min	N/A	N/A
[44]	cube	no ²	1 min	500	N/A
Our	cryptanalytic	yes	5 min	136	6 min

¹Soos et al. require 50 bits of contiguous keystream.

²Sun et al. require control over the encrypted reader nonce $\{n_R\}$





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Practical Experiments

Weak random number generators

Origin	Message	Description
CAR	18	authenticate
TAG	39 OF 20 10	id
CAR	OA 00 00 00 23 71 90 14	$\{\mathbf{n}_{\mathbf{R}}\}\{a_{R}\}$
TAG	27 23 F8 AF	$\{a_T\}$
CAR	18	authenticate
TAG	39 OF 20 10	id
CAR	56 00 00 00 85 CA 95 BA	$\{\mathbf{n}_{\mathbf{R}}\}\{a_{R}\}$
TAG	38 07 50 C5	$\{a_T\}$

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Practical Experiments

- Weak authentication
 - Default password "MIKR"
 - Using key of the form 0xFFFF* * * * **FF

Origin	Message	Description
CAR	18	authenticate
TAG	E4 13 05 1A	id
CAR	4D 49 4B 52	password = MIKR
CAR	18	authenticate
TAG	E4 13 05 1A	id
CAR	DA 63 3D 24 A7 19 07 12	$\{n_R\}\{a_R\}$
TAG	EC 2A 4B 58	$\{a_T\}$

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


Practical Experiments

- Tested cars use identifier white-listing

 Car stores a list of known keys (identifiers)
 Only authenticates to known identifiers
- First wirelessly pickpocket this identifier
 - Low frequency 125 KHz
 - Few inches
 - Approach victim a few milliseconds
 - High frequency 433 MHz
 - Up to 300 feet
 - Eavesdrop when owner closes the doors





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- Starting BMW-1 engine
- Look at tachometer
- Without original key
- Using empty key shell and Proxmark to bypass the immobilizer
- Car keeps running after successful authentication

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8z9mgIkqBA



- Start and drive BMW-5
- Car costs \$100,000 USD
- Broadcasted on the Dutch national television

NIEUWS renkele buien - Dinamo Kiev schakelt Feyenoord uit

Attack implications

- Cipher is broken beyond repair
- With tuned antenna larger pickpocket distances can be achieved
- Very serious when the attacker has a few seconds access to the car and key
 - While renting a car
 - Valet parking at hotel
 - Test drive at the dealer
 - Insurance fraud, car owner theft



Conclusion

- Security by obscurity often covers up negligent designs
- Immobilizer based on 3DES or AES cost only a few dollars more
- Notified the manufacturer NXP
 - Responsible disclosure (6 months ahead)
 - Verified and acknowledged our findings
 - Collaborated constructively by discussing mitigating measures

