





Replication Study: A Cross-Country Field Observation Study of Real World PIN Usage at ATMs and in Various Electronic Payment Scenarios

Towards Understanding Why People Do, or Do Not, Shield PIN Entry

KOMPETENZZENTRUM FÜR ANGEWANDTE SICHERHEITSTECHNOLOGIE (KASTEL) FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE SECURITY ' USABILITY ' SOCIETY (SECUSO)

> Melanie Volkamer Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) Technische Universität Darmstadt melanie.volkamer@kit.edu

Andreas Gutmann **OneSpan Innovation Centre &** University College London andreas.gutmann@onespan.com

Karen Renaud Abertay University University of South Africa University of Glasgow k.renaud@abertay.ac.uk

Peter Mayer Paul Gerber Technische Universität Darmstadt gerber@psychologie.tu-darmstadt.de Technische Universität Darmstadt

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) peter.mayer@kit.edu







Replication Study: A Cross-Country Field Observation Study of Real World PIN Usage at ATMs and in Various Electronic Payment Scenarios







Towards Understanding ATM Security – A Field Study of Real World ATM Use

Alexander De Luca¹, Marc Langheinrich², Heinrich Hussmann¹ ¹Media Informatics Group, University of Munich, Amalienstr. 17, 80333 Munich, Germany {alexander.de.luca, hussmann}@ifi.lmu.de ²Faculty of Informatics, University of Lugano, Via G. Buffi 13, 6904 Lugano, Switzerland langheinrich@acm.org

SOUPS 2010

<u>Replication Study:</u> A Cross-Country <u>Field Observation Study of Real</u> <u>World PIN Usage at ATMs</u> and in Various Electronic Payment Scenarios









What is this talk about?





Replication Study: A <u>Cross-Country</u> Field Observation Study of Real World PIN Usage at ATMs and in Various Electronic Payment Scenarios







Replication Study: A Cross-Country Field Observation Study of Real World PIN Usage at ATMs and in <u>Various Electronic Payment</u> <u>Scenarios</u>













What is this talk about?





Replication Study: A Cross-Country Field Observation Study of Real World PIN Usage at ATMs and in Various Electronic Payment Scenarios

Towards Understanding Why People Do, or Do Not, Shield PIN Entry





Field Observations



7 29.08.18 SOUPS 2018 Talk by Research Group Security • Usability • Society (SECUSO)

Methodology – Observation Locations



- A variety of ATM / payment scenarios
 - 2 ATM scenarios
 - 3 payment scenarios
 - 1 supermarket location with the cashier being present
 - 1 restaurant/coffee bar locations paying with the waitress
 - 1 payment at terminals

Each location was visited at least twice during different time periods

- Locations enabling non-intrusive observations
- Observation sessions were not prolonged





Methodology – Study Design

- Study Factors
 - Country
 - Scenario: Withdrawing vs. Paying
 - Whether accompanied by other people (or not)
- Dependent Variable: Shielded (or not)





Methodology – Study Design

- Study Factors
 - Country
 - Scenario: Withdrawing vs. Paying
 - Whether accompanied by other people (or not)
- Dependent Variable: <u>Shielded (or not)</u>
- Notes taken in written form by one researcher
- Only those observations counted in which the observer was 100% sure
- 930 field observations
- 310 in each country
- 90 at ATM, 220 in payment (supermarket 100, others 120) scenarios

Findings for PIN shielding



Payment: 34% Germany, 14% U.K., 0% Sweden

ATMs

- Our results: 39% Germany, 29% U.K, 29% Sweden
- DeLuca et al.: $23\% \rightarrow$ no significant difference
- Regression Model and Post-hoc ANOVA comparison
 - Country
 - In Germany significantly more people shield compared to U.K. and Sweden
 - For payment: In the U.K. significant more people shield compared to Sweden

Scenario

- Germany: No significant difference between withdrawal and payment
- U.K. & Sweden: Significant fewer people shield in payment scenarios
- Being accompanied or not
 - Our results: No significant differences





Follow-Up Interviews



12 29.08.18 SOUPS 2018 Talk by Research Group Security • Usability • Society (SECUSO)

Procedure

- Asking for availability and consent
- Asked to be frank and honest
- Card usage to pay when paying / withdrawing
- Questions about when and how they / others shield
- Questions about why they think there is a difference between ATM/payment
- 27 interviews (10 in the U.K., 10 in Sweden and 7 in Germany)
 Coding by two of the authors

Methodology

- Public interviews
- Not those that were observed / different places / same cities
- Interviews either in English or German
- Notes were taken in written form







Possible Explanations from Interviews: Payment versus ATM



- Presence of hard cash during withdrawals / different goals
- ATM environements considered more risky
 - "...at an ATM anyone could stand behind you. But people in a supermarket are there to buy something"
 - "You're not supposed to get robbed in stores"
 - "Not something you usually think about in a store"
- Lack of understanding of the actual attack scenarios: People versus cameras
- Habituation
 - Payment happens so often (Sweden, the U.K.) \rightarrow as fast as possible
 - Actually according to the Statistical Office of the European Union payment with PIN happens 5 times more often in the U.K. compared to Germany and seven times more often in Sweden compared to Germany
 - Lack of reminders to shield with payment scenarios





Limitations & Conclusion



SOUPS 2018 Talk by Research Group Security • Usability • Society (SECUSO) 15 29.08.18



Conclusions

Proper shields need to be provided







Karlsruher Institut für Technologie

Conclusions

Proper shields need to be providedJust-in-time reminders







Karlsruher Institut für Technologie

Conclusions

- Proper shields need to be provided
- Just-in-time reminders
- Raising awareness in particular for the payment scenarios











Limitations

Field observation

- Observer objectivity
- More scenarios as we could observe

Interviews

- Explanations provided by our interviewees were not directly provided by the observed subjects
- People may have falsely represented their usual PIN related actions during interviews



Thanks! Questions?



Replication Study: A Cross-Country Field Observation Study of Real World PIN Usage at ATMs and in Various Electronic Payment Scenarios

36%	29%	29%
34%	14%	0%



Habituation, lack of reminders, presence of hard cash, different goals, lack of understanding of the actual attack scenarios





Ethical Considerations



We got clearance from the ethics commision/IRB and legal teams

Acquiring consent

- Would have influenced the measurement
- Muphy and Dingwall (2007): if people are in the public space they give implicit consent to be seen

Deception

- Not really an issue: *covert non-participant*
- Privacy
 - PIN entry is sensitive action
 - All locations were chosen so the observer could not see the entered PIN

Anonymity

21

We did not collect any personal data on the observed subjects



