The author's views are his or her own, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or any Commissioner.

Informing (public) policy

Lorrie Faith Cranor Chief Technologist US Federal Trade Commission











Today's agenda

- How I got involved in public policy work
- What have I been doing at the FTC?
 - Password expiry
 - Police open data
 - Mobile account hijacking
 - Disclosures
- Opportunities for researchers to inform policy

Washington University in St. Louis









"The World Wide Web Consortium, the group that designs standards for the Web, is creating a new way [P3P] for Web sites to transmit th site's privacy policy automatically, and allow users to signal only the information they are willing to share."

— The New York Times 2/22/2000

<ours/></h PROTEP

"P3P will help responsible online businesses empower users to choose the privacy relationship best for them."

> - Christine Varney, former FTC Commissioner



Recom

The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification

W3C Recommendation 16 April 2002 This Version: http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-P3P-20020416/ Latest Version: http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/ Previous Version: http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/PR-P3P-20020128/ Editor: Massimo Marchiori, W3C / MIT / University of Venice, (massimo@w3.org) Authors: Lorrie Cranor, AT&T Marc Langheinrich, ETH Zurich Massimo Marchiori, W3C / MIT / University of Venice Martin Presler-Marshall, IBM Joseph Reagle, W3C/MIT

Please refer to the errata for this document, which may include some normative

See also translations.

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Abstract

This is the specification of the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). This document, along with its normative references, includes all the specification necessary for the implementation of interoperable P3P applications.

Status of This Document







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	Win prizes and help our research Login here if you already signed up
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	Dress, Casual & Athletic Shoes Zappos.com
Privacy Report	Online shoe store selling a variety of brand name men's and women's footwear.
	http://www.zappos.com/ - No Cache - Privacy Policy - Similar Pages
	Nike.com - Shop the Official NikeStore
Privacy Report	Designs, develops, and markets footwear, apparel, equipment, and accessory products.
	Explore Nike's site to shop online, customize products, and find a local store. http://www.nike.com/ - No Cache - <u>Privacy Policy - Similar Pages</u>
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Privacy Report	Shop online for name brand shoes at Onlineshoes.com. Choose from over 170 brands. Enjoy free shipping and exchanges, plus 110% price guarantee on all shoes.
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	Shoes from Shoebuy.com - Free Shipping & Return Shipping
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	Sells mens' and womens' shoes, sandals, boots, and sneakers. http://www.shoebuy.com/ - <u>Cached</u> - <u>Privacy Policy</u> - <u>Similar Pages</u>
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Privacy Report	http://www.shoebuy.com/ - <u>Cached</u> - <u>Privacy Policy</u> - <u>Similar Pages</u> <u>Footwear Shopping in the Yahoo! Directory</u> Browse through footwear shops and official company sites in the Yahoo! Directory. Find retailers selling shoes, boots, and accessories from Nike, adidas, Puma, Timberland, Converse, Reebok, Skechers, and others.
Privacy Report	http://www.shoebuy.com/ - <u>Cached</u> - <u>Privacy Policy</u> - <u>Similar Pages</u> <u>Footwear Shopping in the Yahoo! Directory</u> Browse through footwear shops and official company sites in the Yahoo! Directory. Find retailers selling shoes, boots, and accessories from Nike, adidas, Puma, Timberland,
Privacy Report	http://www.shoebuy.com/ - <u>Cached</u> - <u>Privacy Policy</u> - <u>Similar Pages</u> <u>Footwear Shopping in the Yahoo! Directory</u> Browse through footwear shops and official company sites in the Yahoo! Directory. Find retailers selling shoes, boots, and accessories from Nike, adidas, Puma, Timberland, Converse, Reebok, Skechers, and others. http://dir.yahoo.com/Business_and_Economy/Shopping <u>Cached</u> - <u>Privacy Policy</u> -

Time to read policies of websites you visit: 244 hours/year

How our global services operate

How will we notify you of changes to this poli-



Policies, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 13 Information Society, 2008.

earch for artists, bands, tracks, po

Explore

This Privacy Policy explains the following, amongst other things:

Welcome to SoundCloud®, a service provided by SoundCloud Limited ("SoundCloud"

Your privacy is important to us. This Privacy Policy explains how we collect, store, t disclose your information when you use soundcloud.com and m.soundcloud.com (together, the "Website"), our mobile and desktop apps (the "Apps") and all relate sites, players, widgets, tools, apps, data, software, APIs and other services provided

We have updated our Privacy Policy as of 10 June 2015. SoundCloud Privacy Policy

SOUNDCLOUD

SoundCloud (the "Services").



P. Kelley, J. Bresee, L. Cranor, and R. Reeder. A "Nutrition Label" for Privacy. SOUPS 2009.

P.G. Kelley, L.J. Cesca, J. Bresee, and L.F. Cranor. Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition Label Approach. CHI 2010.



CHI 2012 Why Johnny Can't Opt Out: A Usability Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising

5:42

SOUPS 2012 Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: Perceptions of Online Behavioral Advertising 5:42





FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BUILDING

VISITORS ENTRANCE 6TH & PENN. AVE & ENTRANCE 7TH & PENN AVE



Jessica Rich Bureau of Consumer Protection



Deborah Feinstein Bureau of Competition



Ginger Jin Bureau of Economics





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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PROTECTING AMERICA'S CONSUMERS

i ftc.gov

⊟ MAIN MENU

Q SEARCH

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Office of Technology Research and Investigation

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The Office of Technology Research and Investigation (OTech) is located at the intersection of consumer protection and new technologies. As a trusted source for research and information on technology's impact on consumers, the Office conducts independent studies, evaluates new marketing practices, and provides guidance to consumers, businesses and policy makers. It also assists the FTC's consumer protection investigators and attorneys by providing technical expertise, investigative assistance, and training. The Office is housed in the Bureau of Consumer Protection and its work supports all facets of the FTC's consumer protection mission, including issues related to privacy, data security, connected cars, smart homes, algorithmic transparency, emerging payment methods, fraud, big data, and the Internet of Things.











I created 6 new passwords during my first week at the FTC

14+ characters, 3 classes

Help

OMB No. 3206-0005

Select a username and password and enter them in the fields below, then click the "Submit" button to continue.

Your username must be a minimum of six characters with no spaces or special characters. It may contain letters and/or numbers and is not case specific.

Your password must be a minimum of fourteen characters and contain at least one character from three of the following four categories:

- Uppercase letters (A-Z)
- Lowercase letters (a-z)
- Numbers (0-9)
- Special Characters (#, @, \$, %, &, +, =, *, ?, {, }, [,], <, >, :, ")

Username	
Confirm Username	
Password	

Submit

12+ characters, 4 classes

assword Maintena	nce	
it Password Information		
		24 characters. Must contain at least 1 numeric character. Must contain at case character. Must contain at least 1 special character.
New Password:*		
Confirm New Password:*		
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verify your identity and assist y First Security Question:* Security Answer:* Confirm Security Answer:* Second Security Question:*	ou with resetting your passv Select One	





Encourage your loved ones to change passwords often, making them long, strong, and unique. More tips: go.usa.gov/cEqkH. #ChatSTC

RETWEETS	LIKES 4			
3:51 PM - 2	27 Jan 2016			
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Time to rethink mandatory password changes

By: Lorrie Cranor, Chief Technologist | Mar 2, 2016 10:55AM

TAGS: Authentication | Human-computer interaction | Passwords | Research

Data security is a process that evolves over time as new threats emerge and new countermeasures are developed. The FTC's longstanding advice to companies has been to conduct risk assessments. taking into account factors such as the sensitivity of information they collect and the availability of low-cost measures to mitigate risks. The FTC has also advised companies to keep abreast of security research and advice affecting their sector, as that advice may change. What was



reasonable in 2006 may not be reasonable in 2016. This blog post provides a case study of why keeping up with security advice is important. It explores some age-old security advice that research suggests may not be

Categories

Data security (7) Privacy (12) Passwords (2) Authentication (2) MAC address tracking (2) Mobile location analytics (2) Wi-Fi tracking (1) Mobile device settings (3) In-app purchases (1) Human-computer interaction (4) Accountability (4) Personal harms (3) Data sharing risks (2) Research (6) Fellowships (2) Training (1) Design (3)





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The problems with forcing regular password expiry

Version: 1 Created: 11 April 2016 Updated: 15 April 2016 Topics: Passwords, Best Practice

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Why CESG decided to advise against this long-established security guideline.

Regular password expiry is a common requirement in many security policies. However, in CESG's Password Guidance published in 2015, we explicitly advised against it. This article explains why we made this (for many) unexpected recommendation, and why we think it's the right way forward.

Let's consider how we might limit the harm that comes from an attacker who knows a user's password. The obvious answer is to make the compromised password useless by forcing the legitimate user to replace it with a new one that the attacker doesn't know.

Related Content

Password Guidance: Simplifying Your Approach Revealed: the most frequently used passwords of 2015 Certified Cyber Consultancy Cyber Essentials CESG advocates new approach to





A few formalities

Public preview vs public draft

If you've made it to this page, you can see we're approaching this a little differently by putting our work up on GitHub, rather than the "traditional" comment period for a NIST Special Publication (SP). We're calling it a public preview because some of our agency partners (and NIST itself) have formal processes for public drafts. Calling it a public preview is our way of letting everyone know those processes aren't in play. This lets us do things differently...

A different cadence

This public preview is focused on gaining input through successive open comment periods and editing iterations of the SP draft. This phase will include multiple iterations of comments of approximately 2 weeks in length. followed by a 2-3 week period for the editors to adjudicate comments and make appropriate updates to

NIST preview (comments wanted) Memorized user-chosen secrets

- >= 8 characters
- Allow at least 64 characters, all printing ASCII characters, space
- Do not truncate
- Do not store a hint
- Do not prompt for secret questions (name of first pet)
- Do not impose composition rules

- Blacklist common passwords
- Implement throttling mechanism to limit failed authentication attempts
- Do not require arbitrary periodic password change
- Offer option to display secret when typed and hide after sufficient time
- Store with salt and slow hash

Open police data


Nominations &

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Concern about victims' privacy as police departments release crime data

FTC official reports inconsistency in scrubbing of records

BY ANDREA PETERSON

The Dallas Police Department made public the names, ages and home addresses of some alleged sexual assault victims on an official website, an incident that highlights how the push to put more police records online may also be inadvertently leaving victims exposed.

Dallas police are not alone in revealing the personal data of crime victims on the Internet. The Federal Trade Commission's chief technologist, Lorrie Cranor, said departments across the country have been inconsistent in how they scrub records as they offer more transparency about their activities in the wake of several highprofile police shootings and other uses of force.

Cranor found a police department that created a database that hid personal information in cases of sexual assault but allowed the

names, address tims of other lished. Others of victims bu home addresse "When reco cessible and there may be consequences, blog post this concern is the ple who acce may be able to tims or reveal victims of don sexual assault,

safety and secu Cranor did departments Washington Po new police rec firmed Cranor's findings.

The Dallas Police Department's online incident database does not appear to have included reports categorized as sexual assaults. In at least six other cases, though, the wittin complained of a sexual as formats. As of last week, more than 50 jurisdictions have signed on and some 90 data sets have already been made public in connection with the program — but each jurisdiction makes its own

sexual in nature (regardless of final outcome of the investigation) is filtered out of the system," he wrote.

Kaofeng Lee, deputy director of the Safety Net Project at the National Network to End Domestic Violence, said knowing that the "Depending on what one is looking to release, it can be anywhere from easily doable to impossible," Narayanan said.

Cranor, the FTC chief technologist, and others addressed these issues at an event at the White

Why the names of six people who complained of sexual assault were published online by Dallas police

By Andrea Peterson April 29 🜌



This story has been updated with a statement from the Dallas Police Department, saying it plans to remove the six cases identified by The Washington Post from its online database.

Phone hijacking











FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IdentityTheft.go What To Do Right Aw e you dealing with tax, medical, or child id	Did you get	Log In En E t a data breach notice? Start here	
e you dealing with tax, medical, or child i	ау		
e you dealing with tax, medical, or child i		🖨 Print Check	
	dentity then: See. Special forms (of identity theft	klist
Step 1: Call the companies where you I	know fraud occurred.		
Step 2: Place a fraud alert and get you	r credit reports.		
Step 3: Report identity theft to the FTC			
Step 4: File a report with your local pol	lice department.		
Vhat To Do Next ke a deep breath and begin to repair the	damage.	🖨 Print Check	klist
Close new accounts opened in your na	ame.		
	 Step 3: Report identity theft to the FTC Step 4: File a report with your local pol What To Do Next ke a deep breath and begin to repair the 	 Step 3: Report identity theft to the FTC. Step 4: File a report with your local police department. 	 Step 3: Report identity theft to the FTC. Step 4: File a report with your local police department. What To Do Next We a deep breath and begin to repair the damage.





(20): Check "I have not ... " if Lad (20) One way to get a credit reporting agency to quickly block identity Your Law Enforcement Report information from appearing on your credit report is to submit a enforcement report ("Identity Theft Report"). You can obtain an Report by taking this form to your local law enforcement office supporting documentation. Ask an officer to witness your sign complete the rest of the information in this section. It's impor report number, whether or not you are able to file in person the official law enforcement report. Attach a copy of any cor official law enforcement report you receive when sending t reporting agencies. ☑ I have not filed a law enforcement report. I was unable to file any law enforcement report. Select ONE: I filed an automated report with the law enforce I filed my report in person with the law enforce listed below. Police State Law Enforcement Department Bureau 3/12/16 Filing Date (mm/dd/yyyy)B 16-44728 Officer's Signatur Report Number Officer's Name (please print) 412-422-652 Phone Number Did the victim receive a copy of the report from the l Victim's FTC complaint number (if available): 69211562 DYes OR NO 57











of activity with the device, our conclusion is that the fraudster's intent was to obtain the device only, not to use your mobile services or pretend to be you for other fraudulent purposes. Our investigation determined the authorized retailer, where the fraud occurred, followed proper authentication procedures. The fraudster successfully impersonated you (as the account holder) by providing a driver's license, in which the name matched the account holder and the photo matched the person in the store.





Dena Haritos Tsamitis Same thing happened to me last Thursday!!! Crazy coincidence! I dug into this and discovered mine occurred

Like · Reply · March 9 at 10:15pm



Dena Haritos Tsamitis Sorry...mine occurred in a store in NYC. Someone actually walked into a store and was granted the authority to access my account and make changes. I firmly believe it was an inside job or someone wasn't doing their job.

Like · Reply · March 9 at 10:17pm

















Mobile phone account hijacking and new account fraud

	Number of incidents reported	% of identity theft reports
January 2013	1,083	3.2%
January 2016	2,658	6.3%









Sprint



I called my mobile carrier's fraud department and reported what happened. The representative agreed to remove

78








deray mckesson 📀 @deray



I was hacked today: my Twitter account, two email addresses, & my phone. It was not due to passwords, they hacked my phone account itself.

3:45 PM - 10 Jun 2016





deray mckesson 📀 @deray



At 10:31 am, someone called @verizon impersonating me and successfully changed my SIM & unsuccessfully attempted to change my phone number.

3:46 PM - 10 Jun 2016



9 411



deray mckesson 🥝 @deray



By calling @verizon and successfully changing my phone's SIM, the hacker bypassed two-factor verification which I have on all accounts.

3:47 PM - 10 Jun 2016





deray mckesson <a>@deray



Today I learned that it is rather easy for someone to call the provider & change your SIM. The hacker got the account verification texts.

3:48 PM - 10 Jun 2016



Account Alert \$273 @ Bistro on 02/25/16. Reply CONFIRM if valid or DENY if suspicious

Confirm

Ask us how to quickly and easily set up account alerts.

Onvenie

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Disclosures











Nutrition Facts Serving Size 2 tbsp. (33g) Servings Per Container 7				
Amount Per Serving				
Calories 20	Calories from	Fat 10		
	% Dail	y Value*		
Total Fat 1g		2%		
Sodium 190m	g	8%		
Total Carbohydrate 2g		1%		
Protein 1g				
Vitamin A 2%	• Vitamin C	15%		
Iron 10%	• Vitamin B	6 20%		
Vitamin B12 49	%			
Not a significant source of saturated fat, trans fat, cholesterol, dietary fiber, sugars, and calcium.				
*Percent Daily Values are based on a 2,000 calorie diet.				

Lighting Facts Per Bulb		
Brightness	820 lumens	
Estimated Yearly Ene Based on 3 hrs/day, 11¢ Cost depends on rates a	/kWh	
Life Based on 3 hrs/day	1.4 years	
Light Appearance Warm	Cool	
2700 K Energy Used	60 watts	

Broadband Facts

Fixed broadband consumer disclosure

		Tier
Monthly charge for month-to-month pla	n	\$60.00
Monthly charge for 2 year contract plan		\$55.00
Click here for other pricing options inclu		
bundled with other services, like cable	television and wireless se	ervices.
Other Charges and Terms		
Data included with monthly charge		300GB
Charges for additional data usage - ea	ch additional 50GB	\$10.00
Optional modem or gateway lease – Cu their own modem or gateway; click here		\$10.00/month
Other monthly fees		Not Applicable
One-time fees		
Activation fee		\$50.00
Deposit		\$50.00
Installation fee		\$25.00
Early termination fee		\$240.00
Government Taxes and Other G Apply: Varies by location Other services on network	overnment-Kelateu	rees may
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Performance - Individual experience Typical speed downstream	a may vary	53 Mbps
Performance - Individual experience	e may vary	53 Mbps 6 Mbps
Performance - Individual experience Typical speed downstream		
Performance - Individual experience Typical speed downstream Typical speed upstream		6 Mbps
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Performance - Individual experience Typical speed downstream Typical speed upstream Typical latency Typical packet loss		6 Mbps 35 milliseconds
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Performance - Individual experiences Typical speed downstream Typical speed upstream Typical latency Typical packet loss Network Management Application-specific network management	ent practices?	6 Mbps 35 milliseconds 0.08% Yes
Performance - Individual experiences Typical speed downstream Typical speed upstream Typical latency Typical latency Subscriber-triggered network management	ent practices? nent practices?	6 Mbps 35 milliseconds 0.08% Yes

87

Shop on Google

Sponsored

Based on your search query, we think you are trying to find a product. Clicking in this box will show you results from providers who can fulfill your request. Google may be compensated by some of these providers.

> Nautical Salt Water Sandal in Red ... \$40.95 ModCloth.com

Yuu[™] Pauline **Slip-On Sandals** \$34.99 **JCPenney** \star



WASH WITH SIMILAR COLOURS, WASH INSIDE OUT, WASH AS WOOL CYCLE, DO NOT PILE WHILST DAMP,

SPONSORED STORIES POWERED BY OUTBRAIN



GLAMOUR These Yoga Pants Are Designed to Look Like Legit **Business Apparel**



HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE 6 Things That Will Change the World By 2020



HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE How Fully Remote **SMB** Employees Triumph Over Unique Tech...



AT&T DIGITAL LIFE 6 Amazing New Apps That Will **Change Your Life**



THE VERGE The Alienware Area-51 is a spaceship disguised as a...



MOM.ME 50 Funny

By what criteria should we measure effectiveness?



FTC Workshop: Putting Disclosures to the Test



- September 15, 2016, Washington, DC
- We want to hear about your experiences testing and evaluating disclosures
 - Emphasis on evaluation methods and lessons learned
- Email proposal to present by July 15, 2016
- See ftc.gov/tech

The FTC wants to hear about your research!

Participate in FTC events



- Ransomware workshop September 7
- Drones workshop October 13
- SmartTV workshop December 7
- PrivacyCon January 12





FTC interest in SOUPS-related research

- Disclosures and labeling
- Understanding and quantifying privacy and security
- Investigation and enforcement
- Consumer and business education

- Ads and marketing
- Financial technologies
- Every community
- Anti-trust
- Tools and techniques
- Emerging technologies and trends

Disclosures and labeling

- How to evaluate?
- Pros and cons of short notices, icons, etc?
- User perceptions?
- Influence on behavior?
- Use of automation?
- Role of mediators?



Understanding and quantifying privacy and security

- How do consumers value aspects of privacy?
- What are privacy expectations and concerns in various contexts?
- Impact of information exposure?
- How to assess risk of harm related to security and privacy breaches?
- How do consumers balance privacy against benefits from data?
- Attack trends and responses



Investigation and enforcement

- How can the FTC encourage consumers to report fraud, scams, unwanted calls?
- How can the FTC improve UI for complaint reporting?
- How can the FTC assess self-selection bias in consumer complaints?



Consumer and business education

- How can the FTC measure behavior change as the result of an educational campaign or intervention?
- How usable, informative, and engaging are FTC education materials? How can they be improved?
- How can the FTC better educate consumers to identify well-known signs of fraud?





Canadian?

Privacy Commissioner wants feedback on consent and privacy

99

Responses due July 13, 2016



Consent and privacy

A discussion paper exploring potential enhancements to consent under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act

Prepared by the Policy and Research Group of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada

Public policy contributions CHI 2017 EXPLORE INNOVATE INSPIRE

Understanding policy impacts

- Impacts of law or policy on people
- Impacts of a technology or design on a policy goal





ftc.gov/tech

Icranor @ ftc.gov