NATACHA CROOKS MATTHEW BURKE ETHAN CECCHETTI SITAR HAREL RACHIT AGARWAL LORENZO ALVISI

# Obladi: Oblivious Serializable Transactions in the Cloud

Laboratory for Advanced Systems Research

Cornell University Computer Science

Department of Computer Science at The University of Texas at Austin



#### Obladi

#### a cloud-based transactional key-value store that supports ACID transactions but hides from the cloud what, when, and how data is accessed

# Why Obladi – Cloud Privacy Concerns

Applications are moving to the cloud

Applications store sensitive information



John Da

Cloud storage means sharing data with an untrusted party

Cloud services can be the target of hacking, subpoena

## Protecting sensitive information



Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems

- store/manage patient data
- underpin large hospitals



powered by

### Protecting sensitive information



Use encryption to hide **contents** of the data

Still leaking information about what data is being accessed

Still leaking information about when data is being accessed

# Guaranteeing obliviousness

what data is being accessed

Hiding access patterns (*obliviousness*)



when data is being accessed

how data is being accessed

### How to maintain functionality?

Large body of work on analytical queries **but** no way to run **ACID** transactions obliviously

#### This talk:

#### How to obliviously and efficiently implement serializable ACID transactions on top of untrusted cloud storage

#### Security Guarantees

#### The adversary should learn no information about

- 1. the **data accessed** by ongoing transactions
- 2. the **type of operations** in ongoing transactions
- 3. the **size** of ongoing transactions
- 4. the **outcome** of ongoing transactions



#### Threat Model

#### Obladi adopts the trusted proxy model



Doctors communicating over hospital LAN

Cloud storage (Dynamo,S3, etc.) accessed over WAN

# Failure Model

#### Obladi assumes clients and proxy can fail



But that cloud storage is reliable

# Obladi's security in a nutshell

#### Workload Independence

Obladi ensures that the request pattern sent to the untrusted cloud is independent of ongoing transactions

#### The paradox of transactions

#### Transactions make guaranteeing obliviousness harder

Transactions make improving efficiency easier

Isolation and durability add structure to read/write operations ACID must hold at commit time only

# Oblivious RAM [Goldreich1996]

#### Obladi builds on Oblivious RAM (ORAM)

ORAM hides access patterns for read and write operations by making requests to untrusted storage independent of workload

# ORAM from 1000 feet



Generate physical read/write requests from logical operations

Send requests to (encrypted) dummy data to hide what is being requested

# Challenges of Transactional ORAM

ORAM guarantees workload independence for read/write operations. How can we preserve workload independence but also

- 1) Guarantee Isolation and Atomicity?
- 2) Guarantee Consistency and Durability?
  - 3) Guarantee good performance?

No concurrency control

Write-back ordering for security vs for durability Limited Concurrency

# Delayed Visibility

#### Obladi centers its design around the notion of delayed visibility

#### On the one hand, ACID guarantees apply only when transactions commit

On the other, commit operations can be delayed

Obladi uses delayed visibility to partition transaction into fixed-sized epochs

Delays commit notifications until the epoch ends



# ACID guarantees only hold for committed transactions

Enforce durability and consistency at epoch boundaries only



Within an epoch, Obladi executes transactions at the trusted proxy, buffering writes until epoch ends



**Delayed visibility improves performance** 

1. Reduces number of requests sent to ORAM Only write the last version of every key

2. Implement multi-versioned concurrency control algorithm on top of single-versioned ORAM

Better support for read-only transactions



Delayed visibility should not increase contention

Should allow transactions in the same epoch to see each other's effects

Obladi chooses a concurrency control that optimistically exposes uncommitted writes to ongoing transactions



The fixed structure of epochs helps guarantee **workload independence**.

ORAM observes the **same sequence** of reads followed by the buffered writes



#### How to guarantee good performance?



Send batches of requests to ORAM

#### But ORAM constructions are largely sequential

## Parallelising ORAM



How can we parallelise ORAM?

For correctness: parallelization should be linearizable For security: parallelization should be workload independent

#### Parallelising ORAM



Recall: breakdown logical operations into physical read/writes to cloud storage

# Guaranteeing linearizability



To ensure linearizability

#### Execute operations that do not have **data dependencies** in parallel

Data-dependent operations must be executed sequentially

### Dependencies violate independence



Wait for data dependencies to be satisfied introduces timing channels Only exist between real objects, not dummies

Delaying reads for real objects causes delay, dummy objects don't

#### Introduces side-channel



Can exist between any pairs of reads and writes

Never secure to execute reads and writes in parallel

#### Delayed visibility to the rescue



Delayed visibility allows ORAM to be consistent at epoch boundaries only

Writes can be safely delayed to epoch end

### Delayed visibility to the rescue



Separate ORAM execution into a read phase and a write phase

Read Phase: reads all necessary blocks Write Phase: writes all necessary blocks

#### Delayed visibility to the rescue



Executing each phase in turn obscures data dependencies Still allows high concurrency

#### How to guarantee durability?

Must ensure recovery to a consistent state No partially executed transactions are included

Traditionally achieved through **redo/undo logging** For consistency: pretend partial transactions never happened For security: cannot "undo" what the adversary observed

May lead to access sequences that violate workload independence

# More details in the paper

Durability and recovery logic details

Additional optimisations for performance

Discussion of our chosen ORAM construction: RingORAM [Ren15]

Formal proof of security

### Evaluation

**Applications TPC-C** (10 Warehouses) **SmallBank** (1 million records) FreeHealth (7000 patients, 10 hospitals)

**Baselines** Obladi (Our system) **NoPriv Baseline** (Shares concurrency logic with Obladi) **MySQL 5.7 InnoDB Baseline** (Server co-located with clients)

c5.4xlarge AWS instances. 10 ms latency between proxy and storage

#### Performance Results: The Good



Obladi is slow, but not too slow

Between 5x and 9x lower throughput for contentionbottlenecked TPC-C and FreeHealth

12x lower throughput for resourcebottlenecked SmallBank

#### Performance Results: The Bad



Batching significantly increases latency

Up to 70x on TPC-C

Better on other applications because of smaller write batches

### Performance Results: The Ugly



# Performance is sensitive to good tuning of epoch size

#### If too low, transactions cannot finish If too high, idle time

### Performance Results: The Ugly



# Performance is sensitive to good tuning of epoch size

If too low, transactions cannot finish If too high, idle time

May reveal type of application!

#### Conclusion

#### Obladi, a cloud-based transactional key-value store that obliviously supports ACID transactions using delayed visibility

Any questions?

