Iron: Isolating Network-based CPU in Container Environments

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Virtualization

Virtual machines





Virtualization

Virtual machines

Containers





X Slow





Virtualization

Virtual machines

Containers





X Slow



Light weightFast

Supports new workloads such as microservices and serverless



Containers

Containers require strong resource isolation

- Memory
- Network
- CPU

App1 Container	App2 Container		
OS			
HW			

Containers

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Administrators want to strongly control resource allocation in multi-tenant environments

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Containers

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Administrators want to strongly control resource allocation in multi-tenant environments

Strong isolation is important for *performance*, **predictability** and *efficiency*











allocated share	50%	50%





allocated share	50%	50%
actual usage	50%	50%



OS

HW

App2

Container



Isolation: A container *shouldn't consume* more than its assigned share of *resources*

cgroups ensures **CPU isolation** by *allocating, metering,* and *enforcing* resource usage in the kernel

allocated share	50%	50%
actual usage	50%	50%





Outline

• How and by how much is isolation broken

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- Iron's design
 - Accounting of per-packet processing cost
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Containers





Wordcount can take *1.5x* longer when it shares the core with *TeraSort*

Containers





Wordcount can take 1.5x longer when it shares the core with TeraSort vs running alone

Containers

1) Insufficient isolation

overcharging & high variance in the performance



Containers

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Containers

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Containers

1) Insufficient isolation

overcharging & high variance in the performance

2) Under provisioning

waste of potential revenue



Containers

100%

1) Insufficient isolation → overcharging & high variance in the performance
2) Under provisioning → waste of potential revenue

allocated share







time

-►

Scheduled task/process

compute intensive



Interrupt handler wordcount

time

-

Scheduled task/process



-►




How is Isolation Broken?



How is Isolation Broken?











userspace

kernel

Interrupt handler wordcount

time Scheduled task/process









































• Packet is enqueued in the process context



- Process context No Problem!
- Packet is enqueued in the process context
- System call exits after enqueuing the packet



- Packet is enqueued in the process context
- System call exits after enqueuing the packet
- Soft interrupt is responsible for dequeuing and delivering it to the NIC

Sender side stack

Linux services a softirq

 at the end of hardware interrupt processing, in the context of the *currently scheduled process*

No Problem!	Scheduled task/process
interrupt hander wordcount	
Non-process context	time

Sender side stack

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Sender side stack

Linux services a softirq

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2) through *ksoftirqd thread* (a per core kernel thread)

Sender side stack

Linux services a softirq

 at the end of hardware interrupt processing, in the context of the currently scheduled process



Sender side stack

Linux services the softirq 1) at the end of hardware interrupt processing, in the context of one of the *current scheduled process*.

Softirq processing can be *charged incorrectly* or *not charged* at all to any container

2) through *ksoftirqd thread* (a per core kernel thread)

Container 1	Container 2	Container 3	Container N

Core



Core



Core





Impact Of Network Traffic

Penalty factor Time that victim takes when competing with traffic Time that victim takes when competing with sysbench

Impact Of Network Traffic



HTB is used for traffic shaping @ 5Gbps

Impact Of Network Traffic



HTB is used for traffic shaping @ 5Gbps




Receiver Side

Receiver stack



Receiver Side

Receiver stack



• Receiver side problem is much worse than the sender

Receiver Side

Receiver stack



- Receiver side problem is much worse than the sender
- Packet is processed in non-process context until copied to application's socket







Maximum penalty factor is around **6**

Scenarios When Isolation Breaks



Compute intensive

VS

Network intensive

Scenarios When Isolation Breaks





Low network workload

vs Network intensive vs High network workload

Scenarios When Isolation Breaks



Network intensive



Low network workload

VS

High network workload



Network intensive vs Network intensive with kernel bypass

Iron

A scheme that ensures and enforces accounting of *networkbased CPU* consumed in the kernel on the **behalf of a** *container*.

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NIC interrupt















start_time = localtime()



- Measuring time difference is non-trivial
 - Kernel is preemptable
 - Function in the call stack can be interrupted at any time



end_time = localtime()

run

run



- Measuring time difference is non-trivial
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• Linux batches packets for transmission



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Iron – Accounting



- Linux batches packets for transmission
- We measure the cost of the batch and charge each packet within the batch an equal share
- To identify the container to charge at dequeue
 - We encode the container information in the skb while enqueueing the packet

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Scheduler Integration

Return the accounted time to the container which was incorrectly charged



Scheduler Integration

Return the accounted time to the container which was incorrectly charged



Scheduler Integration

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Scheduler Integration

- Return the accounted time to the container which was incorrectly charged
- *Charge the accounted time* to the container which was *responsible* for the network traffic



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Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration

Reuse infrastructure from cgroup and Linux scheduler



At the end of the period, *running_time* is refilled by *quota*.

Scheduler Integration

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Scheduler Integration



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Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration



Scheduler Integration

Reuse infrastructure from cgroup and Linux scheduler

Throttling a sender ensures isolation! Because throttled sender (runtime < 0) *cannot generate* outgoing traffic. If the receiver is throttled, incoming traffic can still arrive

and consume CPU.



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Receiver stack Con2 Con1 userspace kernel TCP/IP stack vSwitch qdisc/tc **NIC driver** NIC ring buffer NIC

Iron – Enforcement

Dropping Packets

Modifies the Linux's polling mechanism (NAPI) • Assigns a queue (ring buffer) to a container



Iron – Enforcement

Dropping Packets

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- Iron strips the throttled queue from the polling list



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Iron – Enforcement

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Experiment Setup



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Experiment Setup


Sender Interference With Iron





Sender Interference With Iron





Penalty factor remains below **1.04**, significant decrease from **1.85**

Sender Interference With Iron





Penalty factor remains below **1.04**, significant decrease from **1.85**



Penalty factor remains below **1.04**, significant decrease from **1.18**

Receiver Interference With Iron



Receiver Interference With Iron









Penalty factor never exceeds 1.05, significant decrease from 6 for TCP and 4.45 for UDP

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- 48 containers spread over 6 machines
- Each job runs over 24 containers

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MapReduce jobs as victim:

- wordcount: counts word frequency
- **pi**: computes the value of pi
- grep: searches for a given word

Trace based Interferer:

 Shuffle phase of TeraSort job with 115GB input file

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Penalty factor never exceeds **1.04**

Summary

- Evaluated the interference caused by network-based containers.
- Provided hardened isolation for network-based processing in containerized environment.
- Ensures accurate accounting of the time spent processing network traffic in softirq.
- Integrated with Linux scheduler with minimal changes.
- Novel packet dropping mechanism to limit the interference.