Reliable Client Accounting for P2P-Infrastructure Hybrids

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Trends in Content Distribution Networks

- Centralized CDN
 - Clients download from CDN servers, customers pay CDN provider
- New trend: hybrid or peer assisted distribution
 - Clients download from peers and CDN servers
 - Scalability of P2P + reliability & manageability of a centralized system
 - E.g. Akamai NetSession, Velocix P2P Assisted delivery, ...



Hybrid Systems - Challenges

 Untrusted clients + Infrastructure can't observe P2P communication

- What could go wrong? In principle clients may
 - Mishandle content: modify, inject or censor content
 - Affect service quality: delay or abort transfers
 - Misreport P2P transfers

What Do CDNs Currently Do

- Infrastructure provides signed metadata
 - Clients can verify content integrity
- Infrastructure as fallback
 - Maintain service quality in case of failed transfers

What Could Still Go Wrong?

- Inherent problem: infrastructure can't observe P2P communication
 Carried out on
- Clients could still misreport
 - CDN may end up reporting downloads that did not happen



Akamai NetSession!

Akamai NetSession

- Peer assisted CDN operated by Akamai
 - Used for distributing large files software installers and videos
 - Client software is bundled with customer specific installer



Inflation Attack on NetSession

• Have an unmodified NetSession client report fake downloads



Outline

- Introduction
 - Hybrid CDNs: clients can misreport
 - Need a way to reliably account for client activities
- Reliable Client Accounting (RCA)
 - Reliably capture client activities
 - Identify misbehaving/suspicious clients
 - Handle misbehavior without affecting service quality
- Evaluation
- Related work & Conclusion

Types of Attacks

- Misbehaving client software
 - Unilateral deviations from the correct protocol
 - Misreport interactions with honest clients
 - Serve bad content to disrupt quality of service
 - Collusion multiple clients collude to misreport activities
 - Difficult in practice because infrastructure assigns peers
- Suspicious user behavior
 - Repeatedly downloading content to drive up demand
 - Can be amplified by a Sybil attack
 - Not unique to hybrid systems





Require - statistical checks

RCA can detect

deterministically

Reliable Client Accounting – Overview



- Clients maintain a tamper evident log of their network activity
 - Logs periodically uploaded to infrastructure and <mark>verified</mark>
- Quarantine clients if suspicious

Reliably Capturing Client Activity



- Tamper evident logging & log consistency checks [PeerReview, SOSP 2007]
- Log entries form a hash chain
- Signed hash (authenticator) is included with every message sent
 - Client commits to its entire event history
- Log hash chains + authenticators are sufficient to
 - Verify whether all clients report a consistent sequence of message exchange
- Clients cannot unilaterally report fake downloads

Reducing Processing Overhead on the CDN

- Signature verification overhead α number of authenticators
- Previous implementations
 - Records one authenticator for each message
 - Overhead: O(number of messages sent or received)
- RCA: cumulative authenticators
 - Records only two authenticators for each remote client
 - Overhead:

O(number of communicating client pairs) << O(number of messages)

Verifying Client Activity

- A consistent log might still be implausible
 - Contact clients not assigned by infrastructure
 - Serve bad content
- Plausibility checking
 - Verify whether the log is consistent with a valid execution of software
- NetSession protocol can be modeled as a simple state machine
 - Manually identified rules a correct client must obey
 - Verify logs against these rules



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Statistical Checks

- Look for anomalous client behavior
- Large amount of prior work
 - Assume the availability of correct information
- RCA provides a sound basis for anomaly detection



Flag clients who download more than a threshold



Analyze communication patterns to identify colluding clients

Handling Malicious/Suspicious Clients

- Blacklist clients
 - False positives blacklist an innocent client?
- Quarantine clients
 - Not allowed to upload content
 - Can still download from the infrastructure
- Quarantining an innocent client is safe
 - Does not affect service quality of client
 - Slight increase in resource cost to infrastructure
- Enables aggressive anomaly detectors
 - Tamper evident logging: provides accurate information
 - Quarantining: safe way to handle false positives







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Evaluation

- Implemented a clone of NetSession client & Infrastructure software
- Experiments performed in a network emulation environment
 - Driven by actual client activity traces of Akamai NetSession for Dec 2010
- Experiment:
 - Reproduce clients' download activity over a month
 - 500 randomly selected clients
 - 1 edge server and 1 control plane server

Evaluation - Questions

- Client's Perspective
 - Network overhead
 - CPU overhead
 - Log storage
- CDN's Perspective
 - Log processing overhead
 - Statistical checks
 - Effectiveness

Client's Perspective

• Network overhead (in terms of % of actual content downloaded)



Avg extra client B/W: 192 KB/day (signatures + log upload)

- CPU overhead
 - Maximum additional client CPU usage = 0.5%
- Log Storage (with daily log uploads)
 - On average: 100 KB/day

CDN's Perspective

Projections for a large deployment:

- 100 million clients, downloading 100 PB content/month
- Log Uploads & Log Processing
 - 0.05 PB/month of logs uploads (0.05% of transferred content)
 - 35 machines required to process these logs
- For comparison, NetSession as of Dec 2011
 - has 25 million clients, downloading 0.85 PB/month
 - uses about 10 machines for log processing
- Effectiveness
 - Tried out various attacks. RCA caught them as expected

Related Work

- Misbehavior in P2P systems
 - Maze [Q. Lian et al., 2007]
 Empirically study client misbehavior in p2p file sharing systems
 - Dandelion [M. Sirivianos et al., 2007], Antfarm [Peterson et al., 2009]
 Use cryptographic virtual currency to handle selfish peers
 - RCA doesn't aim for fairness and considers more general Byzantine behavior
- Anomaly detection
 - An intrusion detection model [D. Denning, 1987]
 - BotGrep [S. Nagaraja et al., 2010]
 Detect BotNets by studying client interactions
 - RCA enables building complex statistical checks

Conclusion

- Fundamental challenge for P2P-Infrastructure hybrids
 - Infrastructure cannot observe P2P communication
- Demonstrated an inflation attack on the live Akamai NetSession system
- Reliable Client Accounting (RCA)
 - Reliably capture client activity
 - Sound basis for anomaly detection
 - Quarantine: safely handle suspicious clients
- Applied RCA to Akamai NetSession
 - Comprehensive evaluation using actual client traces
 - RCA overhead is reasonable