#### SRE: It's People All the Way Down

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#### $\mathbf{O}$

\$ heroku create sushi
Creating sushi... done
http://sushi.herokuapp.com/ | git@heroku.com:sushi.git

\$ git push heroku master

- ----> Heroku receiving push
- ----> Rails app detected
- ----> Compiled slug size is 8.0MB

http://sushi.herokuapp.com deployed to heroku

#### **Total Ownership Model**









Backpressure Pages

Vision Power Control







Backpressure Pages

Vision Power Control





#### The Old Model

- Dev writes it, Ops runs it Ø
- Dev: move fast  $\bullet$
- Ops: protect their on-call igodot
- Ops says "No" a lot ightarrow



## **Ops Knowledge Gap**



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Image credit: https://www.flickr.com/photos/jonas\_lowgren/4997514953

#### Burnout



Image credit: https://www.nps.gov/features/yell/slidefile/history/1946\_1999/structures/Images/15066.jpg

#### How to Make On-Call not Deadly

- primary/secondary pager rotation
- work-life balance (go the heck home)
- make sure enough people are in the on-call rotation
- 4-hour incident-response shifts

#### Attritrion is a Reliability Risk

## **66** I don't want to have to backfill your a\$@.

- Lex



#### Incident Lifecycle Process

SRE is involved in every incident we have, so we write and update how it's done



#### **Division of Responsibilities**

- Dev
  - incident response
  - service health
- SRE
  - incident coordination
  - holistic platform health



#### Incident Commander



Ruslana Conducting the Orchestra by KrayCeremoush (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

#### Incident Retrospective

What happened, and how can we prevent it from happening again?



#### **Complex failures**

"The loads that created significant leakage were the combined effects of all accumulations of water, including rain after the wind storm, longitudinal flow on the surface of the bridge, and pumping through Nov. 24, 1990. These loads caused static moments [...] that exceeded the threshold for leakage. [E]xisting cracks were open[ed] sufficiently to allow water to leak into the pontoon. Progressive and accelerating sinking began at this time."

Dusenberry, D., Zarghamee, M., Liepins, A., Luft, R., and Kan, F. (1995). "Failure of Lacey V. Murrow Floating Bridge, Seattle, Washington." J. Perform. Constr. Facil., 9(1), 4–23.

#### This was almost a good retrospective

#### Let's do better

Use a template

#### Holistic View of Reliability

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Image credit: dougwoods@Flickr https://www.flickr.com/photos/deerwooduk/579761138

#### Human Error is not a Root Cause

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...human error as a root cause isn't where you should **end**, it's where you should **start** your investigation.

- John Allspaw, referencing Sidney Dekker, David Woods, and others

#### \_ The Human "Problem"



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### "Try Harder" is not a Remediation

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# The beatings will continue until reliability improves.

- some combination of my colleagues



# BLME



#### The Design of Everyday Things



#### **Donald A. Norman**

#### Conway's Law

organizations which design systems ... are constrained to produce designs which are copies of the communication structures of these organizations --Melvin Conway, in **1968** 



It's a sign of human connections

#### Everything is a people problem

Figure out how to love and support your people

### Incident retrospective template:

https://github.com/peculiaire/incident-lifecycle/blob/master/retrotemplate.md

Thanks for listening <3

## Questions?



