

AN EVALUATION OF THE GOOGLE CHROME EXTENSION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE


Nicholas Carlini, Adrienne Porter Felt, David Wagner University of California, Berkeley




CHROME EXTENSIONS




CHROME EXTENSIONS




WEB ATTACKER



WEB ATTACKER




NETWORK ATTACKER




NETWORK ATTACKER


CHROME'S SECURITY MECHANISMS



PRIVILEGE SEPARATION



ISOLATED WORLDS



PERMISSIONS

Vulnerabilities Isolated worlds Privilege separation Permissions New defenses

VULNERABILITIES

FINDING BUGS

SAMPLE

50 most popular + 50 random extensions

METHODS

Black-box testing + source code analysis


VERIFICATION

Built exploits to confirm the vulnerabilities


Vulnerability Location	Web Attacker	Network Attacker
Core	5	50
Content Script	3	1
Website	6	14

70 vulnerabilities in 40 extensions

VULNERABILITIES



VULNERABLE EXTENSIONS



EXAMPLE: SPEED DIAL

ISOLATED WORLDS

Isolated worlds:

protect content scripts

from web attackers

Vulnerability count: 3 content script vulns

DATA AS HTML

MISTAKE

Insert data as HTML, where it can execute

MITIGATION

Will execute in website's isolated world

VULNERABILITIES

6 extensions have data-as-HTML bugs that don't cause content script vulnerabilities



MISTAKE

Use eval to execute untrusted data

MITIGATION

Isolated worlds does not mitigate this bug

VULNERABILITIES

2 vulnerabilities due to this mistake

CLICK INJECTION

MISTAKE

Trusting event handlers on a website

MITIGATION

Isolated worlds does not mitigate this bug

VULNERABILITIES

1 vulnerability due to this mistake


Isolated worlds is highly

effective because it

mitigates common bugs

PRIVILEGE SEPARATION

Privilege separation: protect core extensions



PRIVILEGE SEPARATION

Can regular developers use privilege separation?


Permissions	Extensions
All of the extensions'	7%
Partial: XHRs	15%
Partial: tab control	8%
Partial: other	8%


(Of the 61 extensions with content scripts)


PRIVILEGE "LEAKAGE"

Privilege separation would fully protect most core extensions, but a third of developers circumvent it

Vulnerability count: 50 core extension vulns







HTTP SCRIPTS/XHRS





client-side website

16 HTTP XHRs 28 HTTP scripts

core extension

browser API

history bookmarks

HTTP SCRIPTS/XHRS

Privilege separation can be powerful, but its placement in the system matters


Something else is needed to protect core extensions

PERMISSIONS

Permissions:

limit the scope of core


vulnerabilities



27 buggy extensions

PERMISSION RATE

Reduces potential for severe attacks by half



RATE COMPARISON

No correlation between bugs and permissions

Yes, permissions limit the scope of vulnerabilities

NEW DEFENSES

Use CSP to ban unsafe coding practices

Restriction	Security Benefit	Broken, But Fixable	Broken And Unfixable
No HTTP scripts in cores	15%	15%	0%
No inline scripts	15%	79%	0%
No eval	3%	30%	2%
No HTTP XHRs	17%	29%	14%

POTENTIAL BANS

Restriction	Security Benefit	Broken, But Fixable	Broken And Unfixable
No HTTP scripts in cores	15%	15%	0%
No inline scripts	15%	79%	0%
No eval	3%	30%	2%
No HTTP XHRs	17%	29%	14%

ADOPTION

		Broken, But Fixable	Broken And Unfixable
Chrome 18 policy	27%	85%	2%

ADOPTION

CONCLUSION

- Isolated worlds prevents common bugs
- Some developers don't use privilege separation optimally
- Permissions reduce scope of vulns
- Recommend banning unsafe practices to protect core extensions

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www.adrienneporterfelt.com