Stash in a Flash

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


Outline

- Motivation
- Background
- How to hide
- Detectability
- Performance
- Conclusion

Context

- This paper is about hiding data with plausible deniability in flash memories
- Encryption denies access to private data
- <u>Our goal</u>: adversary cant tell if system is even hiding data



Motivation

- Human rights activist crossing a border in a country ruled by a dictatorship
- User device carries sensitive data
- Intelligence officer at border checkpoint inspects device
- Can confiscate device, and demand encryption key!

– May be resolved with plausible deniability


Our contribution (in context)


- New data hiding technique in flash
- Going against a potent adversary (e.g., government) is extremely challenging
- This paper: a building block towards complete solution
 - Some pieces solved by others
 - Some pieces open problems

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
Storing a single bit in flash






- Page is the read/write unit
- Block is the erase unit

Histogram of bits in a flash chip




Programming a cell




• Flash hardware logic internally applies multiple charging pulses

Programming is imprecise (1)




Programming is imprecise (2)

- Variations exist at all levels:
 - Flash chips of same vendor and model
 - Different areas in chip
 - Different blocks/pages in same area




Interference increases variations

- Programming a cell partially charges neighboring cells
 - 20% of non-programmed cells positively charged



Wear-out adds more variations

 Cell degradation right-shifts distributions as more <u>Program/Erase</u> Cycles (PEC) applied



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Threat model


- User has "public" + secret key
 - Encrypts public data using "public" key
 - Secret key for hidden data w/plausible deniability!
- Adversary (e.g., NSA):
 - Confiscate device for inspection
 - Can probe visible data and voltage levels*

* Requires NDA with vendors

Storing a hidden bit in flash

Voltage-hide method

I. Store public data using coarse-grain programming



Where to hide

n random

numbers

K = secret key, **n** bits to hide

- PRNG initialized with secret key K
- Draw n random offsets in public '1'/'0' bits of page

PRNG

ʻ1' •1'

'1'


'1'

'1'

How to hide

Voltage-hide method


- I. Store public data using coarse-grain programming
- II. Select cells to store extra hidden bits (PRNG + secret key)
- III. Store hidden data using fine-grain programming



How to hide

Voltage-hide method

- I. Store public data using coarse-grain programming
- II. Select cells to store extra hidden bits (PRNG + secret key)
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threshold voltage

- Vendors can tweak programming accuracy on the chip!
 - Voltage-level distribution width
 - Target voltage
 - Threshold voltage


• Flash vendors: Control over low level features



• Us: Improvise by (very) crudely mimicking fine-grain programming



How to hide (cont.)




- Sequence of Partial-Programming (PP) steps (PROGRAM+ABORT)
- Hiding in programmed cells too slow & inaccurate
 → focus on non-programmed cells

- Vendors can implement our scheme in firmware
- We are not flash vendors
- We present an implementation on real hardware
 - Required vendor-specific voltage probing
 - Some limitations from inability to change firmware

Determining capacity

- Small number of nonprogrammed cells to manipulate (<1K)
 → hide only 256 bits per page
- Inherent limitation of not having vendor support



Outline


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Basic idea

- Flash blocks with hidden data can be mistaken for "normal" blocks with similar age
- Voltage variations mistaken for naturally occurring ones (e.g., age, process variation)

Simulating adversary

- Apply Support Vector Machine (SVM) to voltage data
- Three chips with mix of public & hidden data
 - <u>Train</u>: two chips, know which pages have hidden data
 - <u>Classify</u>: 3rd chip: given voltages, has hidden data?
- Hidden and public data PEC vary
 - e.g., normal PEC 1000, hidden PEC 2000
 - Optimal for adversary!



• Works when hidden and normal data PEC are close enough

Outline


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Metric	Our method	State of the art*	Why?
Encoding thr.	35 Kb/s	1.4 Kb/s	Fewer programming steps (10 vs. hundreds)
Latency (single bit)	6.9 ms	798 ms	
Energy	1,183 uJ	43,624 uJ	
Decoding thr.	2.7 Mb/s	54 Kb/s	Single read vs. dozens of programming steps → Reduced wear out!

* "Hiding information in flash memory", IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) 2013


Reliability and retention

- Emulate different retention periods using standard techniques*
 - Bake flash chip in special oven



* Extended arrhenius law of time-to-breakdown of ultrathin gate oxides, APL'03

Reliability and retention (cont.)



• Over time need stronger ECC/refresh


Reliability and retention (cont.)

- State of the art:
 - Similar BER for fresh cells
 - (0.3% vs. 0.5% in VT-HI)
 - Unacceptable BER even for slightly aged cells (e.g., 12% BER for PEC 100)

Capacity


- So far mimicked fine-grain programming
 - Incremental PP
 - Bits per page: 256 vs. 1024 for state of the art ⊗
- Lets simulate "what if" we had vendor support?
 - $-10 \text{ PP} \rightarrow 1 \text{ PP}$
 - -256 bits x 10 \rightarrow 2560 bits

How does hiding 10x more bits affect detectability?



Vendor support (cont.)

- Problems should be resolved with vendor support:
 - Less interference, more accuracy
 - Can hide in programmed cells!



High-capacity, Efficient & accurate

Conclusions

• We can hide data within natural voltage variations

- Already common to increase flash densities

- Vs. State of art:
 - 24x and 50x faster encoding/decoding,
 - 37x more power efficient, and
 - less wear
- Capacity should improve with vendor support

Questions?