



Scalable and Lightweight CTF Infrastructures Using Application Containers

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- CTFs an effective means to teach secure coding and computer security.
- Two popular formats: Jeopardy and Attack-defence.
- Jeopardy: Self-paced, offence only, non-interactive and more popular.
- Attack-defence: Real-time, offence and defence, interactive but less popular.

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4/38



- Both organizers and participants face challenges.
- Organizers: Complex infrastructure engineering and high resource requirements.
- Participants: Complex gameplay, infrastructure setup and IT policies.

Existing game infrastructures Docker Container-based game infrastructure Evaluation Future work Conclusion

Problem



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Can we build less resource intensive and easily scalable contest infrastructures?

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Solution



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Replace virtual machines with application containers.

- Significant reduction in resource usage and engineering required.
- Eliminates several difficult to setup components.
- Improves gameplay experience for participants.



- Challenges in existing attack-defence CTF game format and infrastructures
- Overview of Docker and associated technologies
- Container-based attack-defence CTF game infrastructure
- Performance evaluation
- 5 Future work
- Conclusion

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Challenges in existing attack-defence CTF game format and infrastructures

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- 2 sources: gameplay and game infrastructure.
- Gameplay affects participants: requires doing too many tasks.
- Distracts them from primary objective.
- Infrastructure affects organizers and participants.
- 2 infrastructure types: distributed and centralized.

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Organizers

- Infrastructure needs lot of resources, engineering and monitoring.
- eg: rwthCTF 2012's VPN server: 16GB RAM, 8 core i7 processor and 8 OpenVPN daemon processes.
- Participants
 - Difficult to obtain hardware such as computers and network switches/routers.
 - University IT policies prevent connecting to UDP based VPNs.

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Organizers

- Exponential increase in computing resources required.
- Setting up exploit sandboxes, installing libraries and executing exploits.
- Participants
 - Network latency when accessing services.
 - Recreating services locally for analysis and testing is not straightforward.

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• Locked in to a standard exploit environment.



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Figure : Virtual Machines



Figure : Docker containers



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Images courtesy www.docker.com

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- Built-in container image reuse and extend capabilities.
- Remote API and programming language bindings aid in automation.
- Easy to share and distribute container images.
- Third party tools for container and image management.

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- Docker Inc's Distribution: Tool to manage container images similar to a Git server.
- SUSE's PORTUS: Role-based access control of Distribution's images.
- Allows creating namespaces for teams and assigning different access levels to them.
- Alternatives: GitLab, Dockerhub, Amazon EC2 container service, Google Container Registry and more.

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- **Container registry**: Git server like service for container images.
- **Container hosts**: Servers which run all the containers.
- Service related containers: Docker containers which either run a service or an exploit for a service.
- Flag volume: Docker volumes for persistent storage of flags.
- Modified versions of components of the iCTF centralized framework.







Organizers

- Configure a CTF contest as desired.
- Build the service container images.
- Configure the container registry and upload service container images to it.
- Setup the game database and configure all game scripts.
- Optionally distribute encrypted copies of service container images to all teams.



Participants

- Import the service container images from registry or organizer distributed copies.
- Analyze services for vulnerabilities, fix them and commit and upload changes to container registry.
- Create exploit containers for discovered vulnerabilities in accordance with the requirements, test them locally and upload them.



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A game consists of several rounds with following phases

- Synchronize: All updated container images are synchronized with their live containers or images.
- Store flags: Flags are stored in all services of all teams and services' status is updated.
- **Run exploits**: All exploit containers are run against all services of all teams except exploit author.
- **Retrieve flags**: Flags stored earlier are retrieved, service status is updated and points are deducted if not retrieved successfully.

Existing game infrastructures Docker



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Future work Conclusion

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- Lightweight game infrastructure.
- No need for engineering and monitoring VPN network.

infrastructure

- No need for configuring exploit environments.
- Tools like Docker swarm and Docker cloud further ease managing infrastructure.



- No additional hardware, dealing with IT policies or setting up VPN.
- No dealing with network latency: setup services locally.
- Infrastructure maintains service backups, simplifying gameplay.
- Fully customizable exploit environments.

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- Two kinds of experiments
 - 3 services. 5 to 40 teams.
 - 30 teams. 1 to 8 services.
- Measure CPU utilization and memory usage for a 10 minute game round.
- Worst case: All teams write exploits for all services.
- Compare with estimated usage in VM based infrastructure



- Simulating requires high amounts of resources.
- Estimate based on requirements for InCTF's attack-defence round.
- 1GB RAM for 3 services found sufficient in past 5 editions.
- 200MB RAM per service and rest for the OS.

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- Container server: 16GB RAM and 8 core Intel Core i5 2600 processor.
- Highest memory usage: 3.4GB and 4.4GB. Exploits included.
- Estimated usage for VMs: 40GB and 60GB. Exploits not included.
- Highest CPU usage observed 13% and 20%.
- Can easily handle loads comparable to most attack-defence CTFs today.

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- Challenges in existing attack-defence CTF game format and infrastructures
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Outline

- 5 Future work
- 6 Conclusion



- Develop techniques and identify tuning parameters to prevent overloading of Docker daemon with several simultaneous requests.
- Provide teams access to network traffic captures for reverse engineering exploits.
- Identify parameters to determine utility of CTF game infrastructures.
- Perform usability study of container-based infrastructure.

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Challenges in existing attack-defence CTF game format and infrastructures

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Outline

- 5 Future work
- 6 Conclusion

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- Existing attack-defence CTF game infrastructures are complex to setup and require several computing resources.
- Using application containers instead of virtual machines reduces resource requirement and engineering effort needed.
- Additional tools can improve gameplay experience for participants and further simplify infrastructure management.
- https://github.com/inctf/inctf-framework.

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Figure : Average memory usage: 3 services, multiple teams

Memory(GB)



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Figure : Average memory usage: 30 teams, multiple services



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Figure : Average CPU usage: 3 services, multiple teams



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Figure : Average CPU usage: 30 teams, multiple services



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