Security Implications of Malicious G-Codes in 3D Printing

Authors: 

Jost Rossel, Paderborn University; Vladislav Mladenov, Ruhr University Bochum; Nico Wördenweber and Juraj Somorovsky, Paderborn University

Abstract: 

The rapid growth of 3D printing technology has transformed a wide range of industries, enabling the on-demand production of complex objects, from aerospace components to medical devices. However, this technology also introduces significant security challenges. Previous research highlighted the security implications of G-Codes—commands used to control the printing process. These studies assumed powerful attackers and focused on manipulations of the printed models, leaving gaps in understanding the full attack potential.

In this study, we systematically analyze security threats associated with 3D printing, focusing specifically on vulnerabilities caused by G-Code commands. We introduce attacks and attacker models that assume a less powerful adversary than traditionally considered, broadening the scope of potential security threats. Our findings show that even minimal access to the 3D printer can result in significant security breaches, such as unauthorized access to subsequent print jobs or persistent misconfiguration of the printer. We identify 278 potentially malicious G-Codes across the attack categories Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Model Manipulation. Our evaluation demonstrates the applicability of these attacks across various 3D printers and their firmware. Our findings underscore the need for a better standardization process of G-Codes and corresponding security best practices.

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