Yosef Edery Anahory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Jie Kong, Nicholas Scaglione, and Justin Furuness, University of Connecticut; Hemi Leibowitz, The College of Management Academic Studies; Amir Herzberg and Bing Wang, University of Connecticut; Yossi Gilad, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Withdrawal suppression has been a known weakness of BGP for over a decade. It has a significant detrimental impact on both the reliability and security of inter-domain routing on the Internet. This paper presents Route Status Transparency (RoST), the first design that efficiently and securely thwarts withdrawal suppression misconfigurations and attacks. RoST allows ASes to efficiently verify whether a route has been withdrawn; it is compatible with BGP as well as with BGP security enhancements. We use simulations on the Internet’s AS-level topology to evaluate the benefits from adopting RoST. We use an extensive real-world BGP announcements dataset to show that it is efficient in terms of storage, bandwidth, and computational requirements.
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author = {Yosef Edery Anahory and Jie Kong and Nicholas Scaglione and Justin Furuness and Hemi Leibowitz and Amir Herzberg and Bing Wang and Yossi Gilad},
title = {Suppressing {BGP} Zombies with Route Status Transparency},
booktitle = {22nd USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 25)},
year = {2025},
isbn = {978-1-939133-46-5},
address = {Philadelphia, PA},
pages = {1349--1366},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi25/presentation/anahory},
publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = apr
}
